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This Article offers the foundational account of systemic lying from
a definitional and theoretical perspective. Systemic lying involves the
cooperation of multiple actors in the legal system who lie or violate
their oaths across cases for a consistent reason that is linked to their
conception of justice. It becomes a functioning mechanism within the
legal system and changes the operation of the law as written. By
identifying systemic lying, this Article challenges the assumption
that all lying in the legal system is the same. It argues that systemic
lying poses a particular threat to the legal system. This means that
we should know how to identify it and then try to address it once we
see it happening. Accordingly, this Article presents a guide to iden-
tifying a set of symptoms that are the hallmarks of systemic lying
and posits a unitary cause, although not a one-size-fits-all solution.
Through a series of case studies, it shows that systemic lying emerges
as a saving mechanism that mediates between culture and law.
Rather than allow the law to take its course and deliver what would
be perceived as unjust outcomes, participants lie and preserve the
façade of a system that delivers results consonant with popular
moral intuitions. Systemic lying is both persistent and powerful
because it achieves a type of licitness that individual lies or under-
ground deception lack. At the same time, it poses a unique threat to
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the legitimacy of the system by signifying that truth is not paramount
in the courtroom.
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INTRODUCTION
An English jury finds that the theft of a pair of pants constitutes
manslaughter. A wife accuses her husband of adultery to obtain a
divorce, and he goes along with it, even though they both know this
is a lie. A southern jury acquits a white man of violence against a
black man, despite clear evidence that the man is guilty. A police
officer says he saw a man holding drugs in plain view, even though
the drugs were concealed and were found in a search without
probable cause. What do all these cases have in common? They are
all examples of “systemic lies”: lies that participants in the legal
system tell repeatedly, knowing they are lies and with the complic-
ity of all participants, for what they see as a higher purpose. 
This Article addresses two questions: Do these kinds of lies in the
courtroom ever have efficacy? Can a legal system that relies upon
truth telling for both procedural and substantive fairness tolerate
systemic lying? These questions may seem surprising in the context
of the American legal system, which offers the ideal of justice
through two related guarantees—procedural fairness and outcome
accuracy—that take truth telling by actors within the system for
granted.1 Yet, these questions deserve attention because over a long
span of history, our legal system has experienced repeated bouts of
what I will call “systemic lying.” These episodes are not historical
relics. By many accounts, lying under oath by law enforcement
personnel occurs as a matter of routine and stands as a modern and
ongoing example of systemic lying.2
1. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978) (“[A] purpose of procedural due
process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the government has dealt with him fairly,
as well as to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of protected interests.”); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structur-
al Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864, 871-72 (1979) (discussing whether the Court’s Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence “reflects the value of assuring fair treatment as an individual and
not simply the value of assuring correct outcomes”). The problem of how to enforce this degree
of truthfulness has proved central to the design of legal systems over the centuries. See, e.g.,
GEORGE NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT 4-6 (London, Williams & Norgate 1890) (observing that
“[a] means of ensuring the truth in human testimony has been a thing desired in every age”
and describing historical truth-enforcing mechanisms ranging from various forms of judicial
dueling to extremely elaborate oaths).
2. See infra Part I.D.
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This Article examines the phenomenon of systemic lying and
offers a two-part answer to the questions posed above. Systemic
lying in the legal system is inevitable and seemingly beneficial at
times. It is inevitable because disjunctions between the law and
social beliefs will arise that, when severe enough, provoke systemic
lying as a way to recalibrate the system when formal change is not
forthcoming. Thus, systemic lying alerts us to the existence of a
strong and collective dissonance between moral beliefs and legal
prescriptions. At the same time, systemic lying is not a desirable
mechanism for reducing that dissonance. Although it may at times
accomplish desirable ends, systemic lying is never a positive state
for the legal system for two main reasons. First, it undermines the
premise that truth is a means of achieving accurate and fair out-
comes through law. Second, the open disregard of procedural checks
intended to secure truth in the courtroom undermines the appear-
ance of procedural fairness, which is an important key to legitimacy
and obedience to the law. 
Systemic lying, as I term it, has three key characteristics. First,
unlike the act of one jury, one judge, one prosecutor, or one witness,
it involves the cooperation of multiple actors within the system.
Second, it must be done repeatedly and for a reason that is linked
to the participants’ conception of justice.3 In other words, systemic
lying requires that diverse actors in the system apply a particular
principle that guides their deception across many cases. And finally,
in a corollary of the first two requirements, systemic lying must be
accepted within the system to the degree that it becomes an open
secret. When these elements are met, lying may fairly be described
as systemic because it takes on the characteristic of a functioning
mechanism within the system rather than an inevitable byproduct
of the human tendency to lie.4 Precisely because lies are systemic,
3. Ronald Dworkin refers to this type of conviction as the “ ‘popular morality’ of a
community,” or the “set of opinions about justice and other political and personal virtues that
are held as matters of personal conviction by most of the members of that community.”
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 97 (1986).
4. See Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 165-66 (1999)
(describing lying by professionals and “[o]rdinary people who value and practice a high degree
of honesty” as a frequent occurrence). See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC
LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995) (describing prefer-
ence falsification as a particular type of lying occurring frequently around the world in many
difficult political and social circumstances, either for reasons of politeness or to curry favor).
2180 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2175
in the sense of being widespread, recurring, and told or tolerated by
many participants, systemic lying in a legal system that privileges
truth telling merits examination. 
A subsidiary claim of this Article is that not all lying in the legal
system can or should be understood to be the same. As framed here,
systemic lying focuses on lies told in the courtroom or in ancillary
proceedings, such as depositions, conducted under the formality of
the oath. This focus tracks the dichotomy drawn in our system
between the standard of truth expected in the courtroom and the
standard tolerated beyond its boundaries. This Article uses the
term “courtroom” metaphorically to encompass lies told under oath,
whether in an actual courtroom or in some other setting in which
sworn testimony or statements are given. It is the oath, not the
physical space, that determines the boundary. Within the court-
room, under the force of the oath, our system unambiguously rejects
material lies; outside that boundary, it is at times friendly to or
tolerant of deception. 
The American legal system overtly prioritizes truth in the court-
room through enforcement mechanisms such as the oath,5 the threat
of prosecution for perjury and false statement,6 evidentiary rules
allowing for the impeachment of witnesses,7 and strong norms re-
quiring obedience to and compliance with legal rules.8 These formal
Lying in different professions receives frequent press coverage. See, e.g., Sandeep Jauhar, The
Lies that Doctors and Patients Tell, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://
well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/the-lies-that-doctors-and-patients-tell/ [http://perma.cc/
WC4V-RD4M] (describing deception as a frequent occurrence by physicians when interacting
with patients and by patients when interacting with doctors).
5. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affir-
mation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the
witness’s conscience.”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (“Perjured testimony
‘is at war with justice’ because it can cause a court to render a ‘judgment not resting on
truth.’” (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945))).
7. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608 (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by
testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character.”); see also 3 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 609[02] (1996) (noting that the rationale for
allowing criminal defendants to be impeached with prior convictions and bad acts is that those
instances of misconduct have a direct bearing on the defendant’s credibility as a witness).
8. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94-109, 125-34, 146-47, 161-69, 178
(1990) (finding that perceptions of legitimacy are tied to perceptions of procedural fairness
and perceptions of legitimacy, in turn, have a significant effect on compliance); Tom R. Tyler,
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and informal truth-enforcing devices apply not just to witnesses but
to all participants in the system. Jurors swear oaths to uphold the
law,9 attorneys are bound by oaths and codes of ethics requiring
truthfulness,10 and judges and other government actors are bound
by their own oaths to uphold the law.11
Outside the courtroom, by contrast, our legal system tolerates
and sometimes welcomes deception.12 For instance, unlike Europe-
an countries, such as Germany, that prohibit lying to the accused
during questioning,13 American courts largely treat deceptive
Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 382
(2001) (“[P]eople’s willingness to trust authorities and to defer to their decisions is rooted in
people’s judgments about the fairness of the processes through which those authorities
exercise their authority.”).
9. See, e.g., People v. Hoffler, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266, 271 (App. Div. 2008) (“The statutory
requirement to administer an oath to insure [sic] that prospective jurors truthfully answer
the questions posed to them serves as a significant safeguard of a criminal defendant’s
fundamental constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury.”).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-15 (2014) (requiring that attorneys swear or affirm that
they “will use no falsehood”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311:6 (2014) (requiring admitted
attorneys to swear or affirm that they “will do no falsehood, nor consent that any be done in
the court”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN., ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 5 (West 2014) (requiring
attorneys to swear an oath in which they vow to represent clients using “only those means
consistent with truth and honor” and “never [to] seek to mislead the judge or jury by any
artifice or false statement”). The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct also require “candor toward the tribunal,” prohibiting lawyers from knowingly
making “a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal,” offering evidence “that the lawyer
knows to be false,” and failing to disclose controlling legal authority, among other things.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2013).
11. For example, federal judges must swear an oath or affirmation before beginning to
perform their duties. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (“I, _______ _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and
to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties
incumbent upon me as _______ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help
me God.”). Judicial clerks and deputies in the federal system must swear the following oath: 
I, _____ _____, having been appointed _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will truly and faithfully enter and record all orders, decrees, judgments and
proceedings of such court, and will faithfully and impartially discharge all other
duties of my office according to the best of my abilities and understanding. So
help me God.
Id. at § 951.
12. Deception is sometimes characterized as distinct from lying in that it focuses on the
intent to deceive rather than on the telling of a factual untruth. Many, however, reject that
distinction and include the intention to deceive as part of the definition of lying. See, e.g.,
BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH & TRUTHFULNESS (2002).
13. Jacqueline Ross, Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom? Deceptive
Interrogation in the United States and Germany, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 447 (2008)
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interrogation tactics as lawful as long as the defendants have been
previously advised of their Miranda rights.14 There are outer
boundaries to the ability of law enforcement to use deception in
interrogation, but they are fuzzy. For example, New York’s highest
court recently reversed a conviction based on evidence uncovered
through “patently coercive” police lies.15 Although not officially
sanctioned, other forms of deception outside the courtroom have
been greeted with a degree of indifference that arguably amounts to
the same thing. For example, scholars have argued that the system
tolerates prosecutorial deception in the form of suppressing excul-
patory evidence by failing to provide a remedy for such conduct.16
Systemic lying would be of interest even were it the kind of
behavior we would expect to be openly tolerated in the courtroom.
Lying of many varieties is often socially transgressive even if not
prohibited by any formal stricture, such as a legal or religious
imperative.17 Yet the practice of lying becomes far more problematic
if it is formally prohibited by the very system in which it takes
place. Thus, this discussion of systemic lying focuses on practices
that deviate from the standard of truthfulness that our legal system
purports to expect from its various participants.
Because lying is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon, the
definition used here requires further clarification. There is an enor-
mous literature, across disciplines, on the general theme of lies and
(discussing the rules of criminal procedure in Germany).
14. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak
are not within Miranda’s concerns.”); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308 (N.Y. 2014).
16. See, e.g., Beth Brennan & Andrew King-Ries, A Fall from Grace: United States v. W.R.
Grace and the Need for Criminal Discovery Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 326
(2010) (arguing for criminal discovery reform to remedy problems with prosecutorial
disclosure); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 732 (1987) (arguing that the advantage to be
gained from prosecutorial deception when weighed against the minimal risks should the
deception be uncovered often proves “too much for prosecutors to resist”); Joseph R. Weeks,
No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 842-71 (1997) (describing the extent to
which prosecutors ignore their disclosure obligations).
17. As Sissela Bok writes, “some level of truthfulness has always been seen as essential
to human society, no matter how deficient the observance of other moral principles.” SISSELA
BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 18-19 (1978).
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truth telling and the ways in which our ideas of truth and expecta-
tions for honesty are contingent upon social and cultural context.18
This Article employs a definition of lying that tracks the legal sys-
tem’s own approach to enforcing truth mandates in the courtroom.
By this measure, there are multiple ways an actor may “lie” in the
courtroom. The most straightforward of these is by telling a factual
untruth when under oath. This tracks the definition of perjury.19
Yet, the legal system is also concerned with exposing deceptive testi-
mony in the courtroom. Evidentiary rules aim to uncover deception
by witnesses by allowing the introduction of prior inconsistent
statements,20 as well as impeachment with convictions for crimes
involving “a dishonest act or false statement.”21 Thus, this Article
treats deception in court as a form of “lying” whether or not it would
qualify under the formal definition of perjury. Finally, intentionally
breaking the oaths that constrain jurors, judges, and advocates to
be truthful or to carry out their sworn duties truthfully will also be
treated as a form of “lying.”22 
This Article is concerned both with exposing systemic lying in our
system and with theorizing its presence and function in the law. To
18. For example, lies are expected in politics. As Hannah Arendt famously wrote,
“Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies have always been
regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings.” HANNAH ARENDT, Lying in Politics:
Reflections on the Pentagon Papers, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 3, 4 (1972). For a small
sampling of other influential writing on truth and lying, see, for example, BOK, supra note 17;
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797);
KURAN, supra note 4; WILLIAMS, supra note 12; Allen, supra note 4, at 165-66; Paul Butler,
When Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785, 1792-1805 (2007); and see
also Alasdair MacIntyre, Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn
from Mill and Kant?, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307 (1995).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (defining perjury as “willfully subscrib[ing] as true any
material matter which [a person] does not believe to be true” when he or she has sworn to
testify truthfully).
20. See FED. R. EVID. 612 (providing for the introduction of extrinsic evidence for purposes
of impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(a) (providing
that prior inconsistent statements given under oath are not hearsay and may be admitted for
their truth).
21. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
22. See, e.g., Lawyer’s Oath, STATE BAR MICH., http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/
lawyersoath.cfm [http://perma.cc/4LT5-D8MV] (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) (“I do solemnly
swear (or affirm): I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the State of Michigan; ... I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead
the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.”).
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this end, I examine four examples of the phenomenon: pious perjury
in eighteenth-century England, fabrications of fault or domicile in
order to obtain divorces prior to reforms of divorce laws in the 1960s
and 1970s, post-Reconstruction white southern jury nullification,
and the current widespread practice of police perjury to avoid the
exclusionary rule. These examples are purposefully drawn from dif-
ferent legal areas and historic periods. This approach reveals sys-
temic lying to be a recurrent mechanism that, although in different
guises, arises under certain conditions and performs the same
function over time and across areas.
In each of the case studies, systemic lying is a product of severe
disjunctions between cultural beliefs about justice and legal imper-
atives. The practice emerges as a saving mechanism that mediates
between culture and law, much in the way that the law is often
described as mediating between the social order and the large bu-
reaucratic mechanisms of the state or the market.23 Rather than
allow the law to take its course and deliver what would be perceived
as unjust outcomes, participants lie and preserve the façade of a
system that delivers results consonant with popular moral intu-
itions.
The very collective and open nature of systemic lying and the fact
that it occurs for a justice-related rationale allows it to escape the
usual stigma attached to lying, particularly lying that occurs in a
legal system that valorizes truth in the courtroom. The actors who
collaborate to create systemic lying are not inhibited by their
presumed belief that lying is morally problematic, nor does a fear of
punishment control their behavior. Instead, they subscribe to an
alternate account of justice under which they view themselves as
engaged in a collective, order-promoting enterprise that necessitates
lying. Ultimately, systemic lying is a persistent and effective phen-
omenon for the same reason that it is problematic. It achieves a type
of legitimacy that individual lies or underground deception lack,
gaining purchase within the legal system even as it undercuts the
system’s bedrock—the notion that truth is paramount in the
courtroom.
23. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
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This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I offers four case studies
of systemic lying. Part II offers an account of why systemic lying
arises, what it offers us in the form of understanding disconnects
between beliefs and legal prescriptions, and, finally, the reasons
that we should not be complacent in the face of its ongoing presence
in our legal system.
I. SYSTEMIC LYING: FOUR CASE STUDIES
A. Pious Perjury
In the early nineteenth century, the English law reformer Samuel
Romilly campaigned to awaken public opinion to the “inordinate
number of statutes imposing capital punishment” and the “wide-
spread disinclination to put these statutes fully into effect.”24
English criminal law in this period prescribed the death penalty
for a broad range of crimes, many of them petty.25 For example, in
the late eighteenth century, English law defined grand larceny as
“stealing above the value of twelvepence.”26 Unlike petit larceny,
which under statute was punishable by transportation, grand
larceny was punishable by death.27 This means that the penal code
mandated death for what amounted to trivial theft.
The twelvepence threshold for grand larceny originated in the
tenth century.28 Not surprisingly, across the centuries during which
the threshold remained unchanged, the value of a twelvepence
lessened dramatically.29 Blackstone observed in his Commentaries
that “while every thing else was risen in its nominal value, and
become dearer, the life of man had continually grown cheaper.”30
Juries squeamish at the idea of sentencing their compatriots to die
24. 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 1750, at 526 (1948).
25. This was also true in colonial America. If a colonial jury concluded that death was
inappropriate, it would decline to find guilt or find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime. See
Nancy Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving “Intelligible Content” to the Right to a Jury
Trial, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 935, 939-40 (2010). 
26. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *237.
27. Id. at *237-38.
28. Id. at *237.
29. Id. at *238.
30. Id. at *237.
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for so little would change the value of the stolen goods when they
issued a verdict so that it would not run afoul of the twelvepence
limit.31 Blackstone called the practice “pious perjury,” a name that
captured both the perception that the practice was just and the
reality that it entailed lying under oath.32
Pious perjury used to avoid a capital sentence for a minor theft
was both commonplace and open.33 A number of factors account for
this. The first and most important of these was the perceived moral
necessity for avoiding death sentences in cases that jurors, judges,
and attorneys alike did not believe warranted them.34 A second, con-
tributing factor was that alternative punishments, such as trans-
portation, imprisonment, or fines, would still be imposed once a jury
engaged in pious perjury and convicted a defendant of a lesser
crime.35 The choice was not between death and freedom, but rather
between death and a punishment that at the time seemed consonant
with the severity of the crime.
The near consensus that punishments should be mitigated led to
a high degree of participation by actors within the system, that, in
turn, allowed pious perjury to become routinized.36 Pious perjury
was practiced by judges and witnesses, as well as jurors.37 The in-
volvement of so many legal actors reflected not only the magnitude
and cultural acceptability of pious perjury in the late eighteenth
century but also the structure of the criminal trial itself. In the
eighteenth century, the judge “remained in the foreground” of the
trial.38 At a time when it was still rare for the defendant to have his
31. Id. at *238.
32. Id. As Blackstone explained, this alteration was, in effect, perjury when jurors were
sworn to give “a true ... verdict, so help you God.” Id.
33. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 269 (1985)
(“[M]itigation of the capital sanction for theft was both commonplace and the subject of
commentary in trial accounts, pardon records, and the professional and lay literature of the
day.”).
34. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *238; GREEN, supra note 33, at 282-88
(describing the perceived strength of evidence, character of accused, and perceived pettiness
of accusation as major factors that contributed to jury and judge “general resistance to convict
at a capital level”).
35. See GREEN, supra note 33, at 276 (describing the role of transportation “as a safety
valve where mercy was deemed appropriate”).
36. Id. at 267.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 270-71.
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or her own attorney, judges were active questioners who did not
hesitate to reveal their own points of view during trials.39 In addi-
tion, jury instructions were often “pointed and leading, if not co-
ercive.”40 Finally, class differences between upper-class judges and
lower-middle-class jurymen meant that once instructed, juries were
inclined to come to “verdicts that largely accorded with the views of
the bench.”41 In sum, the degree of acoustic separation between
judge and jury that exists in the modern trial was not present in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.42 This meant that juries
rarely falsified facts in isolation and instead often followed the
judge’s own instructions.
Thus, pious perjury was almost never an independent undertak-
ing by the jury. Given the extensive judicial control, it would have
been impossible for the practice to take root without the cooperation
of judges and magistrates.43 Those authorities, however, seemed just
as convinced as lay juries that justice demanded a softening of the
penalties imposed by eighteenth-century criminal laws.44 As one
reformer explained, the overcapitalization of crimes meant that
“[w]itnesses and juries, rather than violate their kind feelings,
violate their oaths: and the judges themselves cannot permit the law
to take its course.”45 Judges were perhaps more willing participants
in pious perjury because “most of the beneficiaries of mitigation
suffered some substantial punishment.”46 That they were partici-
pants, however, is beyond dispute.47
39. Id. (citing John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 284 (1978)).
40. Id. at 271.
41. Id.
42. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984) (describing “acoustic separation” in modern
law as theoretically dividing official actors who enforce the law from real world actors who
must obey it).
43. GREEN, supra note 33, at 285-86.
44. Id. at 286-87.
45. 3 BASIL MONTAGU, THE OPINIONS OF DIFFERENT AUTHORS UPON THE PUNISHMENT OF
DEATH 125, 125 (London, Longman et al. 1813) (recounting a statement by Sir J. Newport).
46. GREEN, supra note 33, at 267.
47. Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton offered a humorous example of such collusion by the
authorities. According to Buxton’s retelling, even after a jury had returned a guilty verdict for
a man who had stolen a pair of leather breeches, the three magistrates assigned to the case
conspired with several judges to avoid imposing the death penalty. Thomas Fowell Buxton,
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In addition to juries and judges, attorneys also encouraged the
practice of pious perjury. To give one example, a prominent Scottish
attorney for the defendant in a well-publicized dueling case told the
jury that pious perjury, though irregular, had “received an extraor-
dinary sanction” from “the great and most popular writer on the law
of England—I mean Blackstone.”48 He reassured these jurors that
“pious perjury” is “quite familiar, done daily with the acquiescence
of courts, and neither entailing reproach on juries among their
neighbors, nor exposing them to the censure of their legal superi-
ors.”49 In essence, he argued that pious perjury was socially accepted
and an ordinary and functioning part of the British justice system.
Modern scholarship confirms the accuracy of his account. Legal
historian Thomas Green writes, “we can reasonably infer that most
laymen believed that jury-based mitigation was a legitimate part of
the administration of the criminal law.”50 
Pious perjury thus presents a paradigmatic case of systemic lying.
It involved the cooperation of multiple actors in the legal system.
These actors openly falsified verdicts because they did not believe
that the required punishment fit the crime.51 Once the movement to
reform the system of criminal sanctions succeeded, pious perjury
faded away as a routine mechanism to systematically altering pun-
ishments.52 With the revision of criminal sanctions to align with the
justice norms of the era, the need for systemic falsification of ver-
dicts disappeared.53
Member of Parliament, Speech in the House of Commons: Severity of Punishment 62 (May
23, 1821). Their ingenious solution was to alter the official record of conviction. Id. After the
word “guilty,” the magistrates added the words “of manslaughter.” Id. In this way, as Buxton
explained, “[T]he man was tried for stealing breeches, and convicted of [m]anslaughter.” Id.
48. Francis Jeffrey, Speech for the Defense, in THE TRIAL OF JAMES STUART, ESQ., YOUNGER
OF DUNEARN, BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY AT EDINBURGH, ON MONDAY, JUNE 10,
1822, at 147 (Edinburgh, George Ramsay & Co. 1822).
49. Id.
50. GREEN, supra note 33, at 310.
51. Of course, in each individual case, motives for mitigating sentences would depend on
circumstances. See id. at 288. Jury nullification was also practiced in cases involving political
dissenters and cases dealing with laws that were themselves perceived as unfair. Id. at 287-
88. Still, the vast majority of this lying was caused by juries disagreeing with imposing capital
punishment for theft. Id.
52. See id. at 356.
53. Id. (describing how after the reform of the capital punishment scheme in the 1830s,
“[i]n the popular mind, and in reality, the jury would usually adhere to the letter of the law”).
2015] SYSTEMIC LYING 2189
B. Fault Fictions in Pre-Reform Divorce
A century and a half after pious perjury helped prompt reform of
the British penal code, a law reform movement of a different sort
was underway in the United States. Then, as now, the states were
the primary regulators of marriage. They issued marriage licenses
and controlled the process of marriage dissolution. In most states,
divorces would be granted only “upon the proof by one party that the
other had committed a serious offense against the marriage.”54
Those offenses ranged from adultery, the exclusive grounds for
divorce in states including New York,55 to drunkenness, abandon-
ment, mental cruelty, cruel and inhuman treatment, or, in the most
lenient states, incompatibility.56
Although the divorce laws of most states had been in existence for
less than a century, by the 1950s reformers were already advocating
for change.57 One attorney who led divorce reform efforts in New
York explained that the divorce laws no longer reflected prevailing
social mores.58 While adultery was a criminal offense and grounds
for social ostracism when the New York divorce law was passed in
the late 1800s, by 1950, “adultery [was] shrugged off as a common-
place affair which [did] not materially affect the social or community
status of the persons involved.”59 In other parts of the country,
divorce itself had lost much of the social stigma and moral oppro-
brium once associated with it.60 Indeed, in the post-World War era,
many argued that divorce had become “a necessary and desirable
social institution.”61
54. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.
REV. 9, 15 (1990).
55. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 1147 (1920); see also Richard H. Wels, New York: The Poor
Man’s Reno, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 304-05 (1950).
56. Wels, supra note 55, at 306.
57. Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 36-38
(1996).
58. See Wels, supra note 55, at 307.
59. Id.
60. See Wadlington, supra note 57, at 32.
61. Id.; see also Henry S. Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial
Litigation, 66 HARV. L. REV. 443, 444 (1953) (“[T]here can be no doubt that divorce is gener-
ally regarded with very much more complacency than before World War I.”).
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Despite these changes in mores, divorce laws remained static and
continued to require proof of fault.62 In response to fault require-
ments that seemed out of step with social beliefs and the wishes of
an increasing number of couples seeking divorce, a familiar pattern
emerged. Divorce seekers began to “perjure themselves in order to
have their marriage[s] dissolved.”63 Couples either went to a state
where they could more easily obtain a divorce, made a “fabricated
statement of domiciliary intention”64 in order to gain citizenship in
the state and then petitioned for divorce in that state, or they made
a case for divorce in their home jurisdiction by “perjuring them-
selves as to ... the conduct of their spouses.”65 As a law professor put
it in the New York Times, “Americans adjust to strict divorce laws
in either of two ways: by running away from them (seeking out-of-
state or foreign divorces) or by staying at home and resorting to
collusion and fraud.”66
Both responses to strict divorce regimes present examples of sys-
temic lying. Litigants, attorneys, judges, and often paid witnesses
cooperated in maintaining and accepting the lies that facilitated
fault divorces in large numbers of cases in which no actual fault, or
alternatively no jurisdiction over the case, existed. This lying
became routine and was done across cases (and states) all for the
same reason: to obtain a legal divorce when one would otherwise not
be available.67 These practices became an accepted and acknowl-
edged feature of the U.S. divorce system.68
Couples with sufficient means who lived in states with relatively
strict divorce regimes could leave the state for a short period, com-
ply with facial domiciliary requirements—such as residence for six
weeks—in a state with a less strict fault regime, falsely swear that
62. See Wadlington, supra note 57, at 32.
63. Id. at 35.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 85.
66. Monrad G. Paulsen, For a Reform of the Divorce Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1962, at
SM12.
67. In 1960, for example, Alabama granted 17,035 divorces, which was a record high. Id.
The Alabama Health Department explained the numbers by citing the fact that “[t]he state’s
divorce laws have attracted many outsiders.” Id. According to the Department, “a person may
arrive, obtain a decree and leave the following day.” Id.
68. One scholar put the number of divorces obtained, despite being based on the
prohibited ground of “mutual consent,” at 80 to 90 percent. Drinker, supra note 61, at 446.
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they intended to remain in the state, and obtain a divorce from
courts fully aware that the whole enterprise was a charade. In
Nevada, for example, a popular state for migratory divorces because
of its relaxed fault grounds, a divorce plaintiff, in addition to
meeting the six-week residency requirement, would be asked if it
was still his or her present intention “to live here indefinitely and
make Nevada your home?”69 Affirmative answers would go unchal-
lenged, “even if the plaintiff [left] Nevada the day after receiving a
decree.”70 These so-called “migratory divorces” were all the more
appealing because several states allowed for an uncontested divorce,
requiring the presence of only one spouse.71
If a couple did not have the means or time to leave a state with a
strict fault regime, their best option was to fabricate fault. In New
York, for example, a de facto regime developed under which “all that
[was] required [to obtain a divorce] [was] proof that the defendant
was found in a room with a person of the opposite sex (who need not
be identified beyond the positive fact that such person was not the
husband or wife of the defendant).”72 An industry arose involving
private detective agencies who hired women who would “arrange[ ]
to be found in bed in the same room as the newly arrived defen-
dant.”73 The industry was profiled in a 1949 to 1954 report of the
New York County District Attorney that identified “a woman who
played the role of a correspondent in scores of arranged hotel
raids.”74 Another report that looked at testimony in divorce cases be-
tween 1929 and 1933 highlighted a “surprising state of undress in
which the defendant and co-respondent [were] generally found.”75 A
smaller study looked at 104 undefended divorce cases in New York
69. Paulsen, supra note 66, at SM12.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.020 (West 2014) (providing jurisdiction based on
domicile of either plaintiff or defendant); see also Worthington v. Dist. Court, 142 P. 230 (Nev.
1914) (requiring in-state domicile of at least one party for jurisdiction to grant a divorce).
72. Wels, supra note 55, at 316.
73. Id.
74. Paulsen, supra note 66, at SM12.
75. See Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM.
L. REV. 1121, 1130 & n.65 (1936) (citing statistics showing that in a sample of around 485
divorce cases, witnesses testified that the male appeared absolutely nude in 21 cases and the
female appeared nude in 55 cases; the male appeared in underwear in 119 cases and the
female appeared in a negligee in 67 cases).
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and revealed that “close relationships” existed between the defen-
dant and witnesses for the complainant in 81 of those cases.76 Yet
another report from a New York County Grand Jury Presentment
found that “widespread fraud, perjury, collusion and connivance
pervade matrimonial actions of every type.”77
Judges presiding over divorce cases were aware that perjury was
routine. One New York Supreme Court judge described the proto-
typical divorce case as follows: “She is always in a sheer pink robe.
It’s never blue—always pink. And he is always in his shorts when
they catch them.”78 Nevertheless, courts accommodated those
seeking divorces on trumped up fault grounds by not demanding
rigorous proof and ignoring clear indicators that the participants
lacked credibility. Many factors made it obvious that divorce pro-
ceedings often involved collusion, fraud, and perjury, including: the
large number of uncontested cases, the large percentage of unnamed
corespondents, the large numbers of defendants and hotel room
women who opened the door while scantily clothed, the common-
place of the defendant’s friend testifying against him, and the
“unusually short period commonly intervening between the alleged
adultery and the service of process.”79 Sworn complaints alleging
adultery and evidence to the effect that “a man and a woman who
are not married [were] found together in a hotel bedroom”80 were
accepted “despite the fact that in many cases the court [was] prob-
ably not actually deceived.”81
The speed of proceedings was another hallmark of pre-reform
divorce cases. In California, the average uncontested divorce pro-
ceeding took less than ten to fifteen minutes, despite the fact that
“the uncontested divorce purport[ed] to preserve the adversary
process in form.”82 Rather than making an “honest inquiry into fault
adversarily proven in order to arrive at the truth,” however, most
76. Id. at 1130, 1131 & n.66 (citing statistics compiled from divorce transcripts in 1929).
77. Paulsen, supra note 66, at SM12.
78. John G. Rogers, Divorce Court: “Nothing but Perjury and Collusion,” N.Y. HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 1, 1965, at I9.
79. Note, supra note 75, at 1130, 1131 & n.67 (noting that one survey of 408 cases found
that 173 divorce summons were served within three days of the alleged adultery).
80. Wels, supra note 55, at 316.
81. Drinker, supra note 61, at 448.
82. Timothy B. Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in
Response to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267, 284 (1971).
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judges focused on “more pressing problems of property settlement,
alimony, and child custody.”83 A California judge, speaking after
that state’s divorce reform efforts had succeeded, lauded as one of
the law’s triumphs the fact that “the old hypocrisy and prejury [sic]
are no longer countenanced in court.”84 A Texas attorney arguing in
favor of divorce reform in 1972 described the current law as “de-
meaning to the judiciary and to clients” because of the frequency of
obvious perjury in fault-based divorce cases.85 In Boston, one couple
even went to court to sue for the right to a no-fault divorce.86 Their
argument was, in part, that the state should not “require perjury as
the only means by which either plaintiff may obtain a decree of
divorce.”87 Thus, the judges and the parties echoed the public rhet-
oric when they pointed to widespread perjury as a prominent
feature of divorce cases in states requiring proof of fault.
Attorneys, as one might expect, were complicit. As described by
one California divorce reformer, in these cases “[t]he plaintiff and
her witness[es] have been rehearsed in their parts by the attor-
ney.”88 Indeed, “sometimes the rehearsal [was] almost too letter-
perfect.”89 The sheer pink robe and the shorts cited by the New York
judge as ubiquitous features of fault divorce cases show how the
fabrications were “thinly concealed behind the masks of the court-
room players.”90 During a discussion on divorce reform in Boston, a
judge acknowledged that “lawyers under the present situation must
be in an embarrassing position. They’re supposed to be an officer of
83. Id. Of course, some judges did object to the frauds being perpetrated in their
courtrooms. For example, a Missouri judge held an attorney guilty of criminal contempt for
“coaching three Buffalo, N.Y., residents to give perjured testimony that the plaintiffs had been
Missouri residents for more than one year.” Paulsen, supra note 66, at SM12. Similarly, a
court in Alabama on its own motion set aside a 1954 divorce decree between two New Yorkers
because of the fraud “perpetrated upon the Alabama courts by the parties’ false assertion that
they were domiciled in Alabama.” Id.
84. Barbara Carlson, Panelists Back No-Fault Divorce at Bar Association Discussion,
HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 3, 1972, at 9.
85. Id.
86. Margo Miller, Couple Ask Court to Let Them Divorce Without Charges Against One
Another, BOS. GLOBE, May 25, 1973, at 7.
87. Id.
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the court but also have the responsibility to do their best for a
client.”91 That responsibility often translated into assisting clients
in trumping up grounds for divorce and selling them to a judge who
himself was fully aware that the entire enterprise was a charade.92
Given the blatant and widespread nature of the frauds in these
cases and the fact that the courts tolerated the use of lies to satisfy
legal standards, it is not surprising that reformers cast their calls
for reform “as efforts to save the integrity of the law and the legal
process by allowing humane and dignified divorce to couples who
were certain that their marriage was dead.”93 As was the case with
pious perjury, reformers suggested that the integrity of the legal
system was threatened by “the trail of perjury and subterfuge” that
had come to provide de facto access to no-fault divorces.94 The con-
viction that divorce reform would be good for families and that “no-
fault divorce more accurately reflected modern conceptions of
terminating marital relations than did the prior laws” completed the
major argument for reform.95 Reformers eventually succeeded in
effectuating change in the divorce laws of most states. By the late
1980s, almost every state had adopted some type of no-fault regime,
allowing for divorce based on the ground of marital breakdown.96
91. Ellen Pfeifer, Law Panel Discusses No-Fault Divorce Bill, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 29, 1972,
at 3.
92. At times, attorneys went too far even for lenient courts. See, e.g., In re Gale, 75 N.Y.
526, 528 (1879) (disbarring a New York lawyer who had played the part of the corespondent
in a divorce case).
93. Scott, supra note 54, at 17.
94. Olive M. Stone, Moral Judgments and Material Provision in Divorce, 3 FAM. L.Q. 371,
371 (1969).
95. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79,
91-97 (describing reasons put forward by advocates of divorce reform). Of course, those
reforms have not necessarily been a success by every metric. Feminist scholars, in particular,
have argued that the availability of no-fault divorce had negative economic consequences for
women. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 55-56
(1978). In addition, divorce proceedings are still, by many accounts, the site of false testimony.
As one scholar states, “[T]here are indications that no-fault grounds for divorce have only
caused the lying to shift” to child custody and visitation disputes in which parents falsely
accuse each other of abuse. Wardle, supra, at 105. Nonetheless, shifting from a regime in
which all parties collude in lies to one in which witnesses lie in highly contested custody
battles is a move away from systemic lying and into a more routine problem with ascertaining
truth in an adversarial legal system.
96. Wardle, supra note 95, at 88-90 (discussing history of the adoption of no-fault divorce
laws in the United States).
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C. Jury Nullification and the Post-Reconstruction South
The story of jury nullification beginning in the post-Reconstruc-
tion South is familiar.97 White juries routinely convicted black
defendants accused of crimes against whites or exonerated white
defendants accused of crimes against blacks. This systemic post-
Reconstruction nullification of verdicts was enabled by the fact that
it was not just juries that were all white; “state judicial systems
[were] composed entirely of white sheriffs, white prosecutors, white
juries, and white judges.”98 Grand juries who refused to hand down
indictments were also key players. In the words of Gunnar Myrdal,
“It is notorious that practically never have white lynching mobs
been brought to court in the South, even when the killers are known
to all in the community and are mentioned by name in the local
press.”99
Under the system as it existed, white defendants could be assured
of not being indicted, or if they were, of acquittal, thereby depriving
African Americans of protection from the concentrated efforts of the
Ku Klux Klan to murder and intimidate them through violence, as
well as from less orchestrated attacks on their lives or livelihoods.100
97. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 109 (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 64 (1977); GEORGE C. WRIGHT,
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940, at 54-55 (1990); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew
G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 889
(1994); Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1184 (2011); James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth
Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 921 (2004).
98. KLUGER, supra note 97, at 64.
99. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 552-53 (1944).
100. The effect of white southern jury nullification went beyond encouraging violence
against African Americans. A University of Chicago study conducted in the 1950s made two
striking conclusions: “First, all-white juries had trouble taking seriously violence within the
black community,” and “[s]econd, all white juries reacted with severity to black defendants
charged with violence against whites, convicting them in disproportionate numbers.”
ABRAMSON, supra note 97, at 110.
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Well-known cases—Emmett Till101 and the Scottsboro boys,102 to
name just two—bear out this proposition. Others that are less well-
known also show just how pervasive the idea that whatever the
letter of the law, it did not apply in the same way to blacks. To give
one example, a group of white men who shot a white man found
napping on their couch (he had come to the house to buy liquor but
found nobody home) convinced a judge to dismiss charges by
explaining that they mistook the stranger for a black man.103
The collective and open enterprise of denying justice to African
Americans had deep roots in a culture that denied the personhood
of recently emancipated slaves. Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana
summarized the motivations for southern jury nullification during
debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Morton argued that white
men in the South “have been educated and taught to believe that
colored men have no civil and political rights that white men are
bound to respect.”104 Thus, in a sense, white jurors “understood the
law to permit white violence,”105 even though such an interpretation
“was not constitutionally plausible after the Civil War and Four-
teenth Amendment.”106 Indeed, Ku Klux Klan members freely “ac-
knowledged their willingness to disobey the law as jurors in defense
of one another.”107 Senators heard testimony that Klan members
swore oaths “to commit perjury as jurors, and to acquit at all
hazards one of their number who may be upon trial.”108
101. Emmett Till was murdered in Mississippi in 1955 in retaliation for his apparently
having whistled at a white woman. See STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE
STORY OF EMMETT TILL, at ix-x (1988). His murderers—two white men—were acquitted by an
all-white jury and months later confessed to the killing in a magazine interview. Id.
102. The Scottsboro boys were black teenagers accused of raping two white teenage girls
on a train in Alabama in 1931. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (rev. ed. 2007). After an initial trial and appeal, one of the alleged victims admitted
fabricating the rape story during a retrial. Id. Nevertheless, the all-white jury convicted all
of the defendants. The case was tried three times and all three times, the jury handed down
guilty verdicts despite the recantation by one of the victims. Id. Only once was there a black
juror. Id.
103. WRIGHT, supra note 97, at 54.
104. 3 CONG. REC. 1795 (1875) (statement of Sen. Morton).
105. Bressler, supra note 97, at 1184.
106. Id. at 1184, 1188. 
107. Forman, supra note 97, at 921.
108. CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1871) (statement of Sen. Morton).
2015] SYSTEMIC LYING 2197
Thus, this group of white southern nullifiers was acting not out
of confusion about the letter of the law, but because it “fe[lt] and
believe[d], morally, socially, politically, or religiously, that it [was]
not murder for a white man to take the life of a negro with malice
aforethought.”109 As the Freedmen’s Bureau commissioner in Missis-
sippi and Louisiana wrote of the post-emancipation South: 
Wherever I go ... I hear the people talk in such a way as to
indicate that they are yet unable to conceive of the negro as
possessing any rights at all. Men who are honorable in their
dealings with their white neighbors will cheat a negro without
feeling a single twinge of their honor. To kill a negro they do not
deem murder; to debauch a negro woman they do not think
fornication; to take the property away from a negro they do not
consider robbery. 
The reason of all this is simple and manifest. The whites
esteem the blacks their property by natural right.110
Echoing this account, a northern reporter wrote after a trip to the
South, “I did not anywhere find a man who could see that laws
should be applicable to all persons alike.”111 The short-lived Black
Codes, which prescribed a separate set of laws applicable only to
blacks, were a result of these attitudes.112 After the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, which pre-
cluded the use of a separate formal legal code for African Americans,
systemic lying was one way for whites in the South to maintain a
racist justice system. Southern jury members, judges, sheriffs, and
prosecutors routinely violated their oaths to uphold the law by ac-
quitting white defendants of crimes against African Americans and
convicting obviously innocent black defendants of crimes against
whites.113
109. Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 466 (1998) (quoting Lester v. State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 432,
442-43 (1877)).
110. LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 364
(1979).
111. Id. at 364 (quoting SIDNEY ANDREWS, THE SOUTH SINCE THE WAR 398 (Boston, Ticknor
& Fields 1866)).
112. Id. at 370-71.
113. See, e.g., Bressler, supra note 97, at 1182 (describing jurors, sheriffs, justices of the
peace, and other officials’ reluctance to prosecute whites); Forman, supra note 97, at 909-10
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Foreseeing that “all-white juries would serve as instruments of
oppression,”114 Republican legislators sought to forbid state jury
discrimination. They achieved formal success in the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, which forbade disqualification from the jury on the basis of
race.115 The Act also made it a crime for state or federal officials to
discriminate on the basis of race in selecting jurors.116 Despite that
legislative success, however, the reality on the ground was different.
A 1910 study concluded that African Americans never served on
juries in Alabama and Georgia, and they rarely served in several
other states, including Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
South Carolina, and Virginia.117 In 1940, a Carnegie Foundation
study found that “the vast majority of the rural courts in the Deep
South ... made no pretense of putting Negroes on jury lists, much
less calling or using them in trials.”118 
In addition, even when the U.S. Supreme Court belatedly began
to enforce antidiscrimination laws in the context of jury discrimina-
tion in the 1930s, “jury commissioners were under no affirmative
obligation to make jury lists representative of the population, and
so many kept on with attempts to fob off as coincidental the racial
disparities in their jury lists.”119 Despite increasing willingness on
the part of the Supreme Court to find unconstitutional discrimina-
tion based on evidence of the “systematic exclusion” of African
Americans from juries and a steady stream of such cases from 1935
to 1975, the practice of exclusion and the nullification that it en-
abled continued.120 
Certain factors complicate this account as an example of systemic
lying. The history of racial justice and injustice in the post-Recon-
struction South is complex and still being uncovered. In light of
what we know about that time period, it is clear that this form of
jury nullification in the South differs significantly from systemic
(describing all-white jurors’ participation in systemic lying).
114. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 705 (1995).
115. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335-37, declared unconstitutional by The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1893).
116. Id.
117. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 253-72 (AMS
Press 1969) (1910).
118. MYRDAL, supra note 99, at 549-50 (citation omitted).
119. ABRAMSON, supra note 97, at 109.
120. For a brief outline of this history, see id. at 108-12.
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lying that arises in contexts not poisoned by animosity toward the
rule of law. As Darryl Brown has observed in his work on the wider
practice of jury nullification, all-white juries were composed in
violation of the law.121 Among other factors, this led him to question
whether southern white jury nullification belongs in the broader
category of jury nullification.122 Brown is also skeptical about wheth-
er southern nullification in the Jim Crow era fits the jury nullifica-
tion paradigm because local law enforcement officials and “[j]udges
violated the rule of law roughly as much as juries.”123 Despite his
reservations, Brown concludes that these factors do not disqualify
southern white jury nullification from being classified under the
broader category of jury nullification.124 Instead, he argues that they
have important implications for those who would seek to rein in the
practice.125 According to Brown, the participation of other actors
suggests that controlling jury nullification is not simply a matter of
controlling, or in extreme cases eliminating, juries.126 
The same factors that Brown deals with uneasily in his broader
discussion of jury nullification underscore why we need an addition-
al category in order to understand this particular form of multi-
actor, socially driven nullification. The lens of systemic lying sug-
gests that attempting to draw conclusions about jury nullification
from the history of white southern jury nullification may be a mis-
take. Rather than a practice best evaluated in light of theories of
jury nullification, white southern jury nullification is better under-
stood in the context of other instances of systemic lying. It repre-
sents a society in revolt against particular outcomes prescribed by
the justice system and using collective lying to alter those outcomes.
Unlike the general understanding of jury nullification as an
instance in which individual juries refuse to follow the law for case-
specific reasons, white southern jury nullification caused a “collapse
of the rule of law” precisely because it occurred consistently over
121. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1192 (1997) (noting that verdicts exonerating white defendants for crimes against blacks “are
not proper examples of jury nullification because the juries themselves were illegitimate”).
122. Id. at 1191-92.
123. Id. at 1195.
124. See id. at 1196.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1195-96.
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time with the open participation of many legal actors.127 The case is
complicated by the pervasive race-based distortions in the legal
system. Nevertheless, it stands as a cautionary example of systemic
lying. White southern juries, with the help of attorneys and judges,
nullified consistently across different types of cases for a unified,
justice-related rationale: they simply did not believe that it was a
moral affront to commit crimes against blacks.128 Or, conversely,
they believed that the mere potential for black-against-white vio-
lence, particularly sexual violence, justified the punishment of even
factually innocent black defendants.129 In essence, systemic lying
operated to rewrite the substantive criminal code so that it tracked
the beliefs of key actors about how the rule of law should apply to
African Americans. 
Brown characterizes white southern jury nullification as a pro-
duct of “local norms and sentiments strongly [in] conflict with stat-
utes and principles reflecting the consensus of the larger, national
community.”130 That dynamic illustrates an important point about
systemic lying: so long as a cultural group—or a group with shared
norms—is large enough to control multiple actors in the judicial
system, the group may be able to enact their own vision of justice
and, in essence, establish an alternative legal system applicable to
the disfavored group. In this way, white southern jury nullification
functioned as a law-making as well as a law-applying system—
effectively preventing the punishment of whites who committed
violence against blacks. 
Responses to systemic lying will often prove both complex and
elusive. In the South, where multiple actors colluded to violate their
oaths to uphold the law because of a strongly felt belief, however
repellent, that their cause was righteous, neither the usual checks
on rogue actors nor any basic procedural tweak had the power to
recalibrate the system to afford equal justice to African Americans.
Integrating southern juries took a national civil rights movement
with activists willing to risk their lives and liberty, extensive federal
127. Id. at 1194.
128. See Bressler, supra note 97, at 1183-84.
129. See, e.g., Iris Halpern, Rape, Incest, and Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird: On
Alabama’s Legal Construction of Gender and Sexuality in the Context of Racial Subordination,
18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 743, 781-82 (2009).
130. Brown, supra note 121, at 1193.
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intervention, and multiple trips to the U.S. Supreme Court. By
many accounts, nullification of verdicts in cases involving white-on-
black violence is still present in the system, although to a lesser
extent.131 Unlike the examples of pious perjury and the fabrication
of fault or domicile in the divorce context that helped provoke
reform and disappeared rapidly post-reform, the case of white south-
ern jury nullification demonstrates that systemic lying can arise in
reaction to reforms intended to promote justice, and that under such
circumstances, it may prove far more impervious to attempts to
eradicate it.
D. Testilying
The exclusionary rule has been a feature of American constitu-
tional jurisprudence since at least 1914.132 It was not until the
Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio in 1961 and extended this
procedural rule grounded in the Fourth Amendment to state
criminal prosecutions by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment that it achieved its current place as a central feature
of U.S. criminal procedure.133 By all accounts, Mapp’s extension of
the exclusionary rule to cover state law enforcement practices had
an immediate and profound impact on the testimony of police
officers. The case is largely credited with introducing an era in
which police fabricate probable cause for warrantless searches and
131. See, e.g., Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the
Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your
Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 289-90 (2012) (arguing that the initial failure
to prosecute the white defendant, George Zimmerman, in the murder of Trayvon Martin is
a descendant of a more problematic era for black defendants in the criminal justice system);
Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reason-
ableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 420 (1996) (arguing that whether unconscious or conscious,
race still influences jurors’ perceptions of behavior and thereby their application of legal
standards such as “reasonableness”). The recent refusal of a grand jury in Missouri to indict
officer Darren Wilson, a white police officer who shot and killed an unarmed African American
teenager has also been understood to be part of this legacy. See, e.g., Jeannine Bell & Mona
Lynch, Cross-Sectional Challenges: Gender, Race, and Six-Person Juries, (Ind. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 310), available at http://perma.cc/ZS4R-2WBY.
132. Based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the rule is usually
understood to have been formulated in a trio of cases decided between 1886 and 1914. See
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
133. 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961).
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lie about it in exclusionary rule hearings, a practice dubbed “testi-
lying” by members of the New York Police Department.134
In the fifty years since Mapp, testilying has become routine and
bears all the characteristics of systemic lying. Like pious perjury,
divorce fault fabrication, and white southern jury nullification, it is
a group enterprise. Testilying requires the cooperation of prosecu-
tors, police officers, and judges who are willing to ignore obvious
falsehoods in the courtroom. Evidence exists that defendants and
their attorneys are also complicit in the limited sense that, for a
host of reasons, they rarely bring formal complaints of police dis-
honesty.135 In its purest form, as opposed to its corrupt form in
which evidence is fabricated,136 testilying is understood to be done
134. MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCS. OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF N.Y., ANATOMY OF FAILURE:
A PATH FOR SUCCESS 36 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN ET AL., COMMISSION REPORT].
135. See Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A Case for Judging Police by a More
Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 286 (2010) (“Although there is convincing
evidence that police dishonesty, including perjury, is a prevalent and serious problem, in the
District of Kansas, defendants and their lawyers rarely accused officers of lying.”). This may
also reflect prosecutors dropping charges in the cases with the strongest evidence of police
dishonesty. Nevertheless, as Wilson notes, “even if the defendant knows that officers have
falsified police reports, lied in affidavits to secure a warrant, or committed perjury in a
hearing to justify a search in which the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated, she
may forego an argument of police dishonesty in court” for reasons including the perception
that the judge will not credit her account. Id. at 287. 
136. Police perjury in cases in which an officer has actually found contraband in the
possession of a defendant and genuinely believes that he or she must lie at a suppression
hearing in order to avoid letting a guilty defendant go free is only one form of police
manipulation of the truth to gain convictions. The past decade of work with DNA to uncover
wrongful convictions has confirmed that police lie, coerce confessions, or influence witness
testimony to further a theory of the case that will result in a conviction, whether or not they
believe, rightly or wrongly, in the guilt of the defendant. The problem is so significant that the
Brooklyn District Attorney, Charles J. Hynes, created a unit whose mission is specifically to
look into questionable convictions. See Michael Powell & Sharon Otterman, Jailed for 2
Decades in Rabbi’s Death, Unjustly, Prosecutors Find, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2013, at A1. That
unit recently announced that it will ask for the release of a prisoner, David Ranta, who had
been convicted of killing a rabbi in a botched robbery. Id. No physical evidence connected him
to the crime and all of the witnesses in the case had signed statements recanting their
testimony. Id. The original investigation by police, “according to investigators and legal
documents, broke rule after rule.” Id. For example, police coached a witness before a lineup,
bribed other witnesses with visits to prostitutes, improperly questioned the suspect, and failed
to keep any notes of an interrogation as required by department procedure. Id. The trial judge
expressed his concern that the officers had “taken it upon themselves to be judge, jury and
partial executioner.” Id. Nevertheless, he sent the case to the jury without any hint of that
concern. Id. 
Yet, these forms of corruption are distinct from testilying, which is done in order to
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for a rationale that is intertwined with the goals of the justice sys-
tem—to ensure that the truth of the underlying criminal conduct is
revealed by evidence that might otherwise be suppressed. Finally,
testilying is an open practice in the criminal justice system and has
been written about and debated in law journals and the media for
decades.
Testilying seems to have begun in the immediate wake of the
Mapp decision. As early as 1968, a study by Columbia law students
found that in New York narcotics cases after Mapp, there was a
steep decline in police testimony that “contraband was found on the
defendant’s body or hidden in the premises,” in which case it might
have been subject to exclusion on Fourth Amendment grounds based
on the fact that a search occurred without probable cause.137 In-
stead, the study found a “suspicious rise in cases in which ... officers
alleged that the defendant dropped the contraband to the ground”
or openly exposed the contraband, in which case it was in plain view
and no Fourth Amendment problem could arise.138 
At about the same time, Irving Younger, who at various times
served as a prosecutor, judge, and law professor, reported similar
observations. His work in the late 1960s began to bring the issue of
police perjury to the attention of the broader public through an
article in The Nation that was then picked up by The New York
Times. Younger wrote that after Mapp, “police made the great
discovery that if the defendant drops the narcotics on the ground,
after which the police man arrests him, the search is reasonable
and the evidence is admissible.”139 He hypothesized that because
police could not ensure that defendants actually would drop the
drugs or otherwise expose them without being searched, they began
to lie during hearings in order to avoid the suppression of the drug
evidence.140 In a 1967 article with the headline Ex-U.S. Aide Links
overcome a specific aspect of the system by officers who believe that their testilies will achieve
a just outcome when they have found indisputable evidence of guilt. True testilying is sepa-
rated from the broader category of police corruption by its use in one specific circumstance for
a specific reason—at a suppression hearing when an officer has found contraband in the
possession of the defendant.
137. Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics
Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 95 (1968).
138. Id.
139. Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at 597.
140. Id.
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Police to Perjury,141 Younger asserted that police perjury to avoid the
exclusionary rule was widely recognized, and claimed that he was
simply exposing something that “[e]very lawyer who practices in the
criminal courts knows ... is commonplace.”142 
Thus, soon after police perjury seems to have ballooned in re-
sponse to Mapp, testilying was openly discussed in both scholarly
and public forums. And in those discussions, it was linked to the
single justice-based rationale of avoiding the application of the
exclusionary rule in cases in which evidence of guilt had been found.
That multiple actors must cooperate in order for testilying to occur
is implicit in one often-repeated quote from Younger’s Nation arti-
cle: “[E]ven if his lies are exposed in the courtroom, ... the policeman
is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecu-
tor, as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging
heaven.”143
In the succeeding decades, police lying to avoid the strictures of
the exclusionary rule has continued to be written about in largely
the same terms that Younger used. In the mid-1990s, New York’s
Mollen Commission, established to investigate allegations of wide-
spread corruption in the New York City Police Department, discov-
ered that New York City police had a shoptalk term, “testilying,” for
the practice of telling lies to avoid the exclusionary rule.144 After
hundreds of interviews and hearings, and analysis of thousands of
internal police department documents, the Mollen Commission con-
cluded that testilying was “probably the most common form of police
corruption.”145
In 1998, an analysis of all fourteen prior studies of the post-Mapp
exclusionary rule concluded that testilying was both linked to the
exclusionary rule and openly entrenched.146 Although finding that
many of the previous studies were “skewed” by the researcher’s
initial premise, the authors wrote that the “costly effect of the exclu-
sionary rule that emerges from the [previous] studies is that it has
141. Sidney E. Zion, Ex-U.S. Aide Links Police to Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1967, at 112.
142. Id.
143. Younger, supra note 139, at 597.
144. MOLLEN ET AL.,COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 134, at 36.
145. Id.
146. L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary
Rule—A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil
Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669 (1998).
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encouraged police officers to falsify their reports and their testi-
mony.”147 The authors found their own results to be consistent with
what they identified as “the widely held belief that the exclusionary
rule imposes a substantial cost on society in the form of police officer
deception.”148 
Recent work, acknowledging the “extensive evidence that at least
some police give perjured testimony during suppression hearings to
avoid application of the exclusionary rule,” has begun to focus on
other facets of the problem, including the complicity of other ac-
tors.149 One study, conducted by Melanie Wilson in the District of
Kansas, addresses the question whether judges are complicit in
police perjury.150 The Wilson study suggests that in close cases
hinging on credibility, “trial judges would decide for the government
on the issue of police credibility 100% of the time.”151 Even when the
balance of the evidence clearly favored the defendant, judges in
Kansas continued to find in favor of the government.152 Wilson
concludes that if Kansas is representative, “trial judges will reject
even defendants’ strongest proof about 78% of the time.”153 More
than forty years after Irving Younger wrote about police perjury,
Wilson’s study indicates “that judges habitually accept the police-
man’s word.”154
Wilson also found that “criminal defendants rarely assert in court
pleadings or hearings that police have lied.”155 She offers no firm
explanation for this finding, but her hypotheses suggest that de-
fense attorneys contribute to the persistence of testilying by advis-
ing clients not to challenge police credibility.156 She speculates that
“defense lawyers believe that their clients have the greatest chance
of winning a motion using a legal argument, instead of directly
claiming police perjury” or that “defense lawyers believe ... that
147. Id. at 710-11.
148. Id. at 735.
149. Wilson, supra note 135, at 273.
150. Id. at 273, 277-78.
151. Id. at 308.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 277.
155. Id. at 307.
156. Id. at 288.
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judicial recognition of police dishonesty is so uncommon that it will
rarely advance the defendant’s cause to assert police lies.”157 
Anecdotal evidence supports those hypotheses. In 1973, for
example, a deputy district attorney and a deputy public defender
debated the practice in the letters section of the Los Angeles Times.
Rudolph Pearl, the public defender, responding to the Attorney
General’s complaints about the appellate court’s exclusionary rule
decisions, argued that “the practical root cause of the difficulties
with the exclusionary rules is the lack of good faith on the part of
the judiciary and law enforcement officers in enforcing the rules.”158
Pearl included judges in the problem, claiming that “a policeman
learns that if he lies on the witness stand his testimony will be
accepted by the judge.”159 In 1985, an article titled The System
Covers Up for Police Perjurers was featured in major U.S. newspa-
pers.160 That article echoed the argument that prosecutors, judges,
and police work together to admit perjured testimony by the police
in suppression hearings.161 It reported on a speech in which Boston
defense attorney Michael Avery charged that “there is a conspiracy
to protect police officers who commit perjury.”162 Avery is quoted
as claiming that every judge in the Massachusetts criminal courts
“routinely has appearing before him or her police officers who
commit perjury in order to make charges stick in criminal cases.
Everyone knows this, yet few judges would admit it, and none have
addressed the problem.”163
Testilying gained national attention during the O.J. Simpson
trial, which highlighted the broader problem of police lying and also
illustrated the subsidiary problem of police testilying.164 The case
involved blatant lies at an exclusionary hearing by the police who
157. Id.
158. Rudolph Pearl, Letter to the Editor, The Totalitarian Danger of Allowing Improper
Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1973, at B4.
159. Id.
160. Nat Hentoff, The System Covers Up for Police Perjurers, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept.




164. The blatant example of police lying came in the form of Detective Mark Fuhrman’s
assertion that he had not used the word “nigger,” a claim that was proved false by a recording
that caught him using it repeatedly. See James Sterngold, Detective in Simpson Case Pleads
No Contest to Perjury Count, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at A16. 
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had searched the Simpson home without a warrant and recovered
the infamous bloody glove.165 The judge credited the officers’ testi-
mony that “Simpson was not a suspect at the time of [the] search,”
even though it was belied by their own admissions that they knew
Simpson had previously assaulted his ex-wife and that an ex-spouse
is generally a suspect in a murder case.166 After Simpson’s acquittal,
the suppression hearing became a prime example for scholars and
commentators of “the willingness of judges to subvert the law in
criminal cases in order to thwart application of the exclusionary
rule.”167 Scholars argued that police perjury was key to the prosecu-
tion’s failure, and that, as a result, prosecutors around the country
had trouble finding jurors who were not mistrustful of the police.168
The Simpson trial may have influenced public perceptions of the
police, but it had no discernable effect on the practice of testilying.
Both public excoriations of a system that tolerates testilying and
scholarly investigation of the practice continue apace. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s frequent adjustments of the warrant requirement
have, by many accounts, simply made it more necessary for police
to fabricate probable cause for searches as it becomes less and less
clear when a warrant is required.169 Also, there are typically no
repercussions for police who lie or for the prosecutors who put them
on the stand.170 As the former San Francisco Police Commissioner
explained, police “know that in a swearing match between a drug
defendant and a police officer, the judge always rules in favor of the
165. See Simpson Murder Case Transcript of Ruling Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence,
L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A25.
166. Butler, supra note 18, at 1795; see also Sterngold, supra note 164, at A16.
167. Butler, supra note 18, at 1796.
168. Alan Dershowitz, Police Perjury Destroyed the Simpson Prosecution, BUFF. NEWS, Oct.
7, 1995, at 3B; Sterngold, supra note 164, at A16.
169. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1619-20 (2012) (“The gradual evisceration of the warrant requirement is one cause
of Fourth Amendment uncertainty.”).
170. For example, a recent scandal in Philadelphia involved the firing of an assistant
district attorney who sought to drop charges in a case that turned on testimony from a police
officer who had previously admitted to lying under oath. Daniel Denvir, The DA’s Tangled
Web with a Lying Cop, PHILA. CITY PAPER (Sept. 4, 2014), http://citypaper.net/News/The-DAs-
tangled-web-with-a-lying-cop/ [http://perma.cc/EKM8-3ADG]. Rather than prosecute the
officer for perjury, which he had already admitted under oath, supervisors in the district
attorney’s office apparently laughed at the suggestion that the officer be taken off the street.
Id.
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officer.”171 Scholars like Wilson have begun the task of developing
concrete evidence that judges’ willingness to credit police testimony
cannot simply be explained by superior police credibility.172 Instead,
even when they have every reason to disbelieve officers, judges
routinely admit evidence that, from a legal perspective, clearly
should be excluded.173 
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF SYSTEMIC LYING
The four case studies in this Article arose in different time
periods, social milieus, and moments in legal history; were moti-
vated by distinct sentiments and contexts; and were resolved in
differing ways. This diversity of particulars provides both a factual
basis and a justification for articulating a broader theory of systemic
lying. It is precisely because the practice of systemic lying has
recurred over time and in different contexts, yet has significant
common features, that it deserves theoretical attention. This Part
focuses on the linkages between disparate episodes that have until
now been treated as unrelated to offer an explanation for systemic
lying’s multiple appearances in the legal system. It posits that
systemic lying arises in response to stark disconnects between the
moral beliefs of the actors in the legal system and the outcomes that
would come from adherence to formal legal imperatives. Systemic
lying gains purchase in the system only when moral beliefs are both
shared and powerful enough that they cause a breakdown of
obedience to a central and unambiguous procedural tenet of our
justice system—the requirement of truthfulness in the courtroom. 
As a mechanism for reducing the dissonance between formal
legal outcomes and moral beliefs, it is tempting to seek a way to
typologize systemic lying into desirable and undesirable categories.
Indeed, many other mechanisms by which legal actors achieve
change through extralegal means have been lauded for their ability
171. Peter Keane, Why Cops Lie, SFGATE (Mar. 15, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.
com/opinion/openforum/article/Why-cops-lie-2388737.php [http://perma.cc/5UAL-8TFQ].
172. See Wilson, supra note 135, at 263-65.
173. Id. at 301 (citing an empirical study in Kansas showing that “even when the defendant
produced substantial evidence of at least one significant false statement by police, trial judges
... heavily favored the government and usually concluded that any false statements by police
resulted from unintentional mistakes”).
2015] SYSTEMIC LYING 2209
to produce normatively desirable ends. This Part explores and
ultimately rejects the possibility of a typology of systemic lying that
does not hinge on a set of moral or normative priors. It argues
instead that there is one clear shared benefit of systemic lying: its
ability to signal that there is an important dissonance between law
and moral beliefs. Finally, this Part suggests that we should not be
complacent in the face of systemic lying. Whether we like or dislike
the substantive outcomes systemic lying produces, reducing the
dissonance between legal and moral norms through disregard of the
courtroom oath poses real dangers for the system. It threatens the
truth imperative in the courtroom by suggesting that compliance is
optional and will be enforced selectively. More broadly, systemic
lying represents an affront to procedural justice that has the
potential to undermine legitimacy.
A. Systemic Lying as a Response to Moral-Formal Conflict
Systemic lying arises in response to severe disconnects between
a community’s beliefs about what is just in a particular case and the
outcomes that a strict adherence to the law would produce. Concep-
tualized another way, systemic lying is a result of misalignments
between strongly held community norms and the normative force of
the law. Multiple actors within the legal system experience what
Leon Festinger first labeled “cognitive dissonance.”174 In the legal
context, Robert Cover articulated this phenomenon as the need to
confront “inconsistency among consciously held and articulated
principles.”175 The actors in the legal system confront a “moral-
formal” dilemma.176 Here, the systemic liars’ understanding of what
would be just in a particular case conflicts with the mandate that
they uphold the law in court. Their “fidelity to the formal system”
would “block direct application of the moral or natural law proposi-
tion.”177
Under Cover’s framework, dissonance-reducing behaviors are like-
ly to arise in situations in which actors “must choose among closely
174. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
175. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 227
n. (1975).
176. Id. at 197.
177. Id.
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balanced, inconsistent alternatives.”178 The actors have strong rea-
sons to choose formal compliance with the law, and equally strong
reasons to refuse to comply in order to achieve a just outcome.179
Cover addresses the dilemma that antislavery judges faced when
asked to enforce fugitive slave laws.180 He explains that judges ex-
perienced a conflict between their obligation to “apply[ ] legal rules
impersonally” and their self-image as “moral human being[s].”181
When confronted with an ordinary case involving some cognitive
dissonance, the judge might, without too much trouble, choose “role
fidelity” and uphold the law.182 Fugitive slave cases, however, gener-
ated “a more particular dissonance between antipathy to a result
that would condemn a man, fundamentally innocent, to undeserved
slavery and the knowledge or belief that such an action was re-
quired by fidelity to role expectations and rules.”183 The “dissonance
reducing” behaviors Cover identifies consist of rhetorical strategies
used by the antislavery judges, among them increased reliance on
formalism, to reduce the dissonance between their moral beliefs and
results required by law.184
Cover’s cognitive dissonance study reveals not “judicial civil dis-
obedience,”185 as he had advocated in previous work, but its opposite,
judicial formalism accompanied by rhetoric that increased the
“moral comfort” of the judges.186 When Cover’s framework is applied
to systemic lying, the practice emerges as a dissonance-reducing be-
havior that falls between strict obedience to the law and overt civil
disobedience. The actors pay lip service to the law, as did Cover’s
178. Id. at 227.





184. Id. at 229 (“These judges exhibited three patterns in their judicial and extrajudicial
reflections on fugitive slave cases: (1) elevation of the formal stakes, (2) retreat to a
mechanical formalism, and (3) ascription of responsibility elsewhere.”).
185. Cover’s theory in Justice Accused has been contrasted with the forceful call to action
in his earlier essay in which he called for judges to “simply refuse to follow law or authority
and set resisters [to the Vietnam war] free.” Robert M. Cover, Atrocious Judges: Lives of
Judges Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments of Oppression, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003,
1007 (1968) (reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES (1856)).
186. Here, I borrow from James Whitman’s description of the development of the reason-
able doubt standard as a way to increase the moral comfort of judges and juries. JAMES Q.
WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT (2008).
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judges. But unlike the antislavery judges who ultimately followed
the law, systemic lying allows actors to thwart the formal law even
as they purport to apply or follow it. The practice of systemic lying
thus emerges as a way for legal actors to ameliorate dissonance
while maintaining the charade of compliance with the letter of the
law. Rather than resort to “naked acts of power” or highlight the
“moral reasons for the decision,”187 systemic lying reduces disso-
nance between legal and moral norms through the more subtle, yet
more compromising, act of falsehood. 
Before turning to the problems with resolving dissonance through
falsehood, it is worth unraveling more fully how the “moral-for-
mal”188 dilemmas described in the case studies are ameliorated
through systemic lying. Although systemic lying is a product of
cognitive dissonance, it differs from the fugitive slave example, in
which judges were the primary actors,189 because it is by definition
collective. For systemic lying to take hold, it is not enough for a
marginalized or even powerful but discrete group, such as judges, to
believe that injustice will result from a strict application of the law.
Instead, systemic lying arises only when moral beliefs are both
shared and powerful enough that they cause a breakdown of obedi-
ence to a central and unambiguous procedural tenet of our justice
system—the requirement of truthfulness in the courtroom. Judges,
attorneys, and often jury members must all decide that justice de-
mands different outcomes from those that would be produced by
fidelity to the facts and the law, and that achieving those outcomes
is worth sacrificing the courtroom demand for truthful testimony.
The fact that systemic lying is a collective enterprise is also an
important key to its staying power and functionality. Whereas
antislavery judges reinforced their own determination to apply a
distasteful law by “ascri[bing] ... responsibility elsewhere,”190 sys-
temic liars gain reinforcement from the perception that shared
social norms favor the lie over strict adherence to the law. As a col-
lective enterprise, systemic lying offers a veneer of legitimacy that
187. Cover, supra note 185, at 1007.
188. See COVER, supra note 175, at 197-98. 
189. Cover describes the importance of advocates as well, but ultimately the decisions in
these cases were made by judges. See id. at 197 (discussing the behavior of “judges and the
men who addressed them”).
190. Id. at 229.
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eases the moral burden of each individual’s participation in the
practice in multiple ways. Rather than seek justifications for their
decisions in formal law, systemic liars have the perceived wisdom
of the crowd to push them in the direction of the systemic lie over an
adherence to the formal demands of truthfulness.191 Just how that
collectivism works to reinforce the practice is complex, but the
knowledge that others have made the same determination offers a
degree of “moral comfort” to the systemic liar that must be acknowl-
edged in an account of the endurance and expansion of systemic
lying. The rhetoric employed by attorneys in pious perjury cases
supports this notion. As the Scottish barrister described above ar-
gued to his jury, they could take comfort in knowing the practice
was “quite familiar, done daily with the acquiescence of courts, and
neither entailing reproach on juries among their neighbours, nor
exposing them to the censure of their legal superiors.”192
Even as it suggests a forceful moral consensus, the group dynamic
of systemic lying may also allow the practice to detach itself from its
moral groundings. Cass Sunstein and others have suggested that in
situations in which group members follow practices established
previously within a group, the group mentality can take on its own
force to the exclusion of individual members’ beliefs.193 Thus, the
collective nature of systemic lying may at some point strip partici-
pants of their own moral agency, impelling them to comply with a
specific systemic lying norm based on their group membership
rather than on any judgment about the substance of the practice.
Sunstein argues that this phenomenon is an important caveat to
the idea that there is invariably wisdom in crowd decision making;
crowds can move in perverse directions because of their inclina-
tion to follow the leader.194 Although any given instance of systemic
lying reflects a group reaction to dissonance between legal norms
and moral norms, there may be a diminution in the degree to which
191. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3,
Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics, 23 POL. THEORY 563 (1995) (describing the theory that in the
context of political decision making, aggregate decision making is better than individual de-
cision making).
192. Jeffrey, supra note 48, at 147.
193. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 119-20 (2009); see also ADRIAN
VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 147 (2009) (discussing pathologies that impair
group decision making).
194. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 122-24 (2003).
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subsequent actors engage in the moral calculation involved in
choosing the lie over imperatives of truth in the courtroom. 
Systemic lying is therefore a more complicated phenomenon than
the response of one actor to a “moral-formal” conflict. The case
studies suggest that, at a minimum, systemic lying may arise when
the law has lagged behind evolving moral beliefs, when the law
changes ahead of those beliefs, when the system confronts a
particularly difficult question—such as a so-called “Dirty Harry
problem”—or when a need exists to balance constitutional and
crime-fighting imperatives.195 In the case of pious perjury, for
example, neither the public nor the judges agreed with the man-
dates of an outmoded penal code, leading to a widespread practice
of altering verdicts to allow lesser punishments, such as transporta-
tion or imprisonment, which were more in line with popular
beliefs.196 Similarly, couples seeking divorces in strict fault states
reacted to laws that were out of step with social attitudes by
colluding in and permitting the systematic fabrication of fault or
domicile.197 For juries composed of white southerners in the post-
Reconstruction South, the violent conflict between the law and their
own beliefs about the justice system’s applicability to African
Americans was the product of the imposition of a new legal order,
rather than a result of outmoded laws.198 Despite its moral repug-
nance, this practice is nonetheless an example of a severe disjunc-
tion between the vision of justice offered by the legal system and
that of the judges, attorneys, and laypeople charged with carrying
it out. 
Finally, with testilying, we see a contemporary example of con-
sensus among legal actors that justice is served by oath breaking.199
This example of systemic lying, however, involves oath breaking
motivated by a desire to avoid the impact of procedural rules that
would have the effect of allowing a factually guilty defendant to
195. See, e.g., Carl B. Klockars, The Dirty Harry Problem, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 33, 35-36 (1980) (describing the “Dirty Harry problem” as a dilemma in which only
morally problematic means are available to “achieve the good end”).
196. See supra Part I.A.
197. See supra Part I.B.
198. See supra Part I.C.
199. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67
U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1044 (1996) (arguing that police lie out of “a desire to see the guilty
brought to ‘justice’” despite the technicalities of the exclusionary rule).
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escape punishment.200 Although the idea that we might privilege
competing policy goals over the quest to convict the guilty is deeply
embedded in our legal system,201 the exclusionary rule put new and
direct pressure on the conflict between the ideal of procedural jus-
tice and the fundamental premise that the justice system should, if
it does nothing else, punish the guilty.202 As Justice Cardozo wrote
in a much-quoted early exclusionary rule opinion, it is difficult to ac-
cept that a criminal should “go free because the constable ... blun-
dered.”203 More recently, Chief Justice Roberts expressed a similar
view, writing that “[t]he principal cost of applying the [exclusionary]
rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants
go free.”204 The Chief Justice went on to observe that releasing those
defendants “offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system,”205
an observation that could be taken to validate the view that the end
of convicting a law breaker justifies the means of lying under oath
when it comes to the exclusionary rule. 
Although other motives certainly exist for testilying—among
them pressure to secure convictions—just as in the other examples
of systemic lying, broader community moral beliefs play a crucial
role in guiding police and judicial decisions about whether to
disregard legal requirements.206 With no less a figure than the Chief
Justice suggesting that it is antithetical to justice to let a guilty
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408 (providing a special relevance rule excluding attempts to
compromise or settle, along with conduct during settlement, as evidence of fault, based on the
policy goal of encouraging settlement); FED. R. EVID. 410 (providing a special relevance rule
excluding withdrawn guilty pleas and statements during plea negotiations, based on the
policy goal of encouraging plea bargains); FED. R. EVID. 501 (detailing spousal and other
evidentiary privileges).
202. For an excellent discussion of problems with theorizing the exclusionary rule as a
procedural mechanism that is designed to deter police misconduct, see Richard M. Re, The
Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1894-97 (2014). 
203. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
204. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009).
205. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984)).
206. Comment, supra note 137, at 100 (“Police behavior seldom exceeds the limits of
community-approved standards. When a community protests, claiming that police patrol
practices exceed acceptable limits, it is not necessarily demanding strict compliance with
constitutionally mandated procedures. Instead, the community may only be asking that the
police be more selective in deciding whom to line up against the wall.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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defendant go free, it is not surprising that testilying has become a
routine practice in the law enforcement community.
B. A Typology of Systemic Lying?
As is evident from Cover’s work on antislavery judges, systemic
lying is not the only way in which legal actors resolve moral-formal
dilemmas or law/justice conflicts that stem from misalignments
between law and social beliefs. “Nullification practices,” William
Simon’s useful shorthand for informal law-changing mechanisms,
allow both legal and non-legal actors to adapt legal outcomes to
moral and social values.207 Juries, judges, and prosecutors all have
the power to change formal law through the refusal to seek indict-
ments, hand down verdicts, enforce laws, or follow statutory or even
constitutional imperatives.208 Proponents of these informal practices
have argued that the process of legal elaboration can productively
involve not just rigid adherence to jurisdictionally sound laws209 but
also consideration of the moral values that undergird the law. When
actors “nullify” the law, in other words, they arguably engage in a
valuable form of legal development.
For example, in discussing modes of constitutional formation,
Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal laud the “constrained illegality
and quasi-direct democracy” of the Federalists’ call for ratifying
conventions as a “revolutionary break with existing rules” that
nonetheless “represented a breakthrough for democratic ideals.”210
In the corporate law context, Ian Ayers has argued that when cer-
tain state courts have blatantly refused to follow clear statutory
mandates, such nullification of “Procrustean, immutable provisions
207. William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 226
(1996).
208. Id.
209. This positivist approach is typified by Justice Scalia’s assertion, “I do not feel empow-
ered to revoke those laws that I do not consider good laws. If they are stupid laws, I apply
them anyway, unless they go so contrary to my conscience that I must resign.” Antonin
Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at Gregorian University: The Common Christian
Good (May 2, 1996), available at http://perma.cc/6PYG-G5CT. Justice Scalia distinguishes
between so-called “natural law” and “positive law” explaining that God applies the former and
it is his job to apply the latter. Id.
210. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
475, 567-68 (1995); see also Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99
YALE L.J. 453, 456 (1989).
2216 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2175
by a few individual state courts” has the capacity not only to pro-
mote dialogue with their own state legislatures, but also to inform
and motivate legislative action more broadly.211 Paul Butler and
others have made similar arguments in the criminal law context,
suggesting that judges should and do engage in their own form of
nullification “when the correct legal response conflicts with the
correct moral response.”212
Along the same lines, Guido Calabresi has suggested that even
when confronted by the plain language of statutes, courts should
take a common law interpretive approach to “statutory rules that
are out of phase.”213 According to Calabresi, this approach would
simply bring to the surface what courts had been accomplishing
“through subterfuges, fictions, and willful use of inappropriate
doctrines.”214 Yet, the rhetorical device of the legal fiction itself has
inspired the same argument. Sir Henry Maine wrote that “[a]t a
particular stage of social progress,” legal fictions “are invaluable
expedients for overcoming the rigidity of law.”215 Blackstone argued
that such fictions could be “highly beneficial and useful” because “no
fiction shall extend to work an injury; it’s [sic] proper operation
being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might
result from the general rule of law.”216
Superficially, systemic lying seems akin to the deft use of a legal
fiction or the refusal to follow an “out of phase” statutory rule.217
Systemic lying, informally yet effectively, changes the law by provid-
ing a mechanism for routinely circumventing it. Given this similar-
ity, it is no surprise that just as scholars have argued in favor of
other nullification practices, there have been calls for systemic
lying. For example, Paul Butler has argued, controversially, that
black jurors should engage in a form of systemic jury nullification
211. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365,
370 (1992).
212. Butler, supra note 18, at 1792-1805 (describing instances when judges “subvert” legal
mandates based on moral beliefs and advocating such subversion).
213. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 166 (1982).
214. Id.
215. Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, in THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 371 (Lon
L. Fuller ed., 1949).
216. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *43.
217. CALABRESI, supra note 213, at 166.
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of verdicts against nonviolent African American lawbreakers.218
Butler makes the case that such nullification is justified despite a
defendant’s factual guilt because “no moral obligation [attaches] to
follow an unjust law.”219 
According to his theory, black jurors have a “legitimizing func-
tion” in a legal system that has historically excluded them, making
their decision to nullify a particularly powerful tool to promote
change.220 He cites examples in which other actors in the system,
from spectators in the courtroom to defense attorneys, could
contribute to the nullification practice by “send[ing] ... black jurors
a message” that they should “consider the evidence presented at
trial in light of ” the racial discrimination inherent in the system.221
Butler makes it clear that in his vision, systemic nullification of
certain verdicts against black defendants would not only involve
many African Americans sitting on juries and refusing to convict for
a consistent, justice-related rationale—“that the American criminal
justice system discriminates against blacks”222—but that such nullif-
ication could engage other actors in the legal system and would be
an open secret with hoped-for repercussions for the substantive law. 
Josh Bowers has argued for a different form of systemic lying.223
His argument is that defense attorneys should be required to “ad-
vise and assist innocent defendants who wish to mouth dishonest
on-the-record words of guilt.”224 Bowers offers a justice-related ratio-
nale for his proposal. He suggests that the system perpetrates an
injustice when it allows “a factually guilty defendant to make a ra-
tional choice in the face of plea bargaining’s benefits and trial’s po-
tential penalties and travails, but ... force[s] an innocent defendant
... to risk, against her will, an uncertain trial with significant
downside.”225 Citing the system’s strong aversion—grounded in what
218. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
219. Id. at 708.
220. Id. at 714.
221. Id. at 684-85, 688-90 (describing controversy over a judge’s refusal to allow black
defense attorney in murder trial of black man to wear kente cloth, an African cloth that had
been adopted as a symbol of racial pride, in front of jury).
222. Id. at 689-90.
223. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2008).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1159.
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he believes to be an “antiquated truth-seeking ideal”226—to existing
mechanisms that allow defendants to plead guilty when they, in
fact, believe they are innocent, such as Alford and nolo contendere
pleas, Bowers argues that allowing attorneys to recommend and
judges to accept what he terms “false admissions” would be analo-
gous to creating a legal fiction.227 The false admission would be
“another means of bending law to ‘promote[ ] function, form, and
sometimes even fairness.’ ”228 
Both Bowers and Butler echo the principle, expressed by Cala-
bresi, Ayers, Ackerman and Katyal, that at times acting in a way
that is not consistent with formal legal prescriptions will serve the
ends of justice and possibly lead to a change in the law. Dworkin
makes a similar claim in the context of Vietnam-era draft resis-
tance. He argues that there was a strong case for the exercise of
discretion not to prosecute conscientious draft offenders, in part
because there was a strong case “for changing the laws in their
favor.”229 These arguments are attractive, and as a descriptive
matter they seem to explain at least two of the case studies of sys-
temic lying. Like all instances of systemic lying, both pious perjury
and the practice of fabricating fault in divorce cases were justified
on the ground that they accomplished important moral goals.230 And
unlike the other two case studies examined here, both also antici-
pated legal reforms that validated the moral position of the systemic
liars.
Of course, the justifications advanced for nullification practices
do not easily accommodate the case of white southern jury nullifi-
cation. Although southern jury nullification did provide an avenue
for the expression of strongly held beliefs that the law was “out
of phase,” to use Calabresi’s expression,231 it did not adjust the law
in a way that was later validated through reform. Dworkin might
226. Id. at 1171.
227. Id. at 1170-74.
228. Id. at 1174 (quoting Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 875
(1986)).
229. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 220-21 (1977) (arguing that once the
Supreme Court makes a ruling on the constitutionality of draft laws, courts and prosecutors
should primarily show respect for the dissenters’ position through the exercise of sentencing
discretion).
230. See supra Part I.A-B.
231. CALABRESI, supra note 213, at 166.
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distinguish the case of the white southern nullifiers in the same
way that he addresses the difference between conscientious draft
objectors and “sincere and ardent segregationists [who] believe[d]
that the civil rights laws and decisions [were] unconstitutional.”232
According to Dworkin, the difference between the two cases has to
do with whether the law at issue reflects an “official decision that
individuals have a moral right to be free from some harm.”233 If a
law reflects a judgment that we have a moral right to be free from
violations that involve personal injury or the destruction of prop-
erty, it is “a powerful argument against tolerating violations.”234
This distinction between laws that protect “moral rights” and
those that simply reflect values of “social or administrative conve-
nience” is not particularly illuminating when applied to the case
studies of systemic lying.235 The first category certainly applies to
white southern jury nullification, which without a doubt sought to
take away moral rights from blacks, such as the right to be free
from violence. But it would likely also apply to the moral right to be
free from petty theft, which the eighteenth-century penal code ex-
pressed. Further, it is difficult to say where this distinction would
leave fault fabrication in divorce cases. An argument could be—and
was—made that children had a moral right to a two-parent house-
hold absent the most exigent circumstances or that society had a
moral right to seek to preserve marriages. This is a weaker fit with
Dworkin’s “moral right” category because it conflicts with other im-
portant rights of autonomy and self-determination.
At the same time, divorce fault fabrication does not fit any better
with Dworkin’s description of why laws regulating the draft did not
invoke moral rights. The saving technicalities that Dworkin claims
made draft laws administrative rather than rights preserving—that
they allowed for a great deal of administrative discretion and re-
flected considerations of fairness in the sense that they spared sons
of mothers who had already lost one son in the war236—did not exist
in pre-reform divorce statutes.
232. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 218.
233. Id. at 217.
234. Id. at 217-18. 
235. Id. at 218.
236. Id.
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This analysis is by no means exhaustive, but it provides a taste
of the difficulties inherent in attempting to form a typology of all
systemic lying from the perspective of whether it is morally justified
or justifiable. Systemic lying is a unified practice in the sense that
it is a particular mechanism for resolving dissonance arising from
moral-legal dilemmas, but its particular forms do not offer a
unitary, or even binary, message about the moral rightness or
wrongness of the practice. 
What systemic lying offers instead is a consistent structural
message about the presence of a particular form of tension within
the legal system: the existence of strong and collective dissonance
between moral beliefs and legal prescriptions. As described above,
a common refrain in the calls for practices that informally adapt the
law to changing beliefs or circumstances is the idea that they are
beneficial because they will promote reform. What we can extract
from this refrain is the underlying idea that these types of practices
tell us something about the way the law is tracking beliefs or
keeping up with modern realities. It is this self-reflective function,
not its potential to achieve justice ahead of law reform, that is the
one unmitigated benefit of systemic lying. 
C. Systemic Lying as Problem or Solution
Systemic lying is valuable as a symptom of a larger problem that
may require remediation through legislative, judicial, and/or other
forms of intervention. Yet, it is not a positive condition for the legal
system such that we should welcome it when it appears and ratio-
nalize it as an efficient de facto solution to certain moral-formal
dilemmas. There are reasons for this that would emerge from any
discussion of nullification practices: they are often undemocratic in
nature, unreviewable, and inconsistently applied, and they can be
deployed for ill as well as for good.237 Those arguments are relevant
to systemic lying, but their contours are not markedly different in
237. See, e.g., Steven M. Warshawsky, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and
Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 191, 219, 222-23 (1996) (arguing that democratic
legitimacy problems, unreviewability, and justice deficits inhere in jury nullification); Richard
St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Author-
ized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2565 (1997) (describing democratic legitimacy
problems inherent in jury nullification).
2015] SYSTEMIC LYING 2221
this context than in others in which they continue to be discussed.
Rather than rehash them, this Section focuses on the ways in which
systemic lying has the potential to be uniquely destabilizing in a
justice system that holds out the oath and the truth imperative in
the courtroom as fundamental legitimizing forces. 
The American legal system’s view of truth is far from absolute.238
As discussed in the previous Section, many have persuasively ar-
gued that the contingency of preventing a grave injustice could
permit (or even mandate) lies in narrow circumstances.239 If we
accept the premise that it is at times right to lie to prevent the
miscarriage of justice,240 then we leave open the possibility that it
will sometimes be right to approve systemic lying in certain
scenarios. Whether it is right will, in turn, require case-specific
moral analysis.241 This Section does not foreclose the possibility that
systemic lying may be a morally correct response to certain situa-
tions. It is important to recognize, however, that there are costs to
the practice that are associated with features unique to systemic
lying.
Because it involves the open violation of principles of truthfulness
in the courtroom, systemic lying undermines the important premise
that in the context of our justice system, truth will help guaran-
tee accurate and fair outcomes through law. A related but distinct
threat comes from the collaboration of multiple actors. The open dis-
regard of procedural checks intended to secure truth in the court-
room, such as perjury prosecutions, impeachment of witnesses, and
judicial refusal to countenance false evidence, not only is problem-
atic if we believe in the system of checks and balances, but also
238. Our approach to deceptive interrogation practices provides one example of our
openness to deception. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 13.
239. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 18, at 1822-23 (acknowledging lying as a “moral cost” but
arguing in favor of judicial subversion of the law in limited circumstances); see also supra Part
II.B (discussing the practices that involve deception yet are seen as positive for the legal
system).
240. See IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives (1797), re-
printed in CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346,
346-50 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., 1949) (arguing that there is a categorical imperative
to tell the truth even when it seems that a lie would save a life).
241. As Tom Tyler observed when explaining his decision to focus on procedural justice and
its relationship to perceived legitimacy as opposed to outcome favorability: “Because there is
no single, commonly accepted set of moral values against which to judge the fairness of
outcomes ... such evaluations are difficult to make.” TYLER, supra note 8, at 109.
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because it undermines the appearance of procedural fairness, which
is an important key to legitimacy and obedience to the law. 
1. The Truth Imperative
In her seminal work on lying, Sissela Bok outlines the reasons for
what she argues is the “centrality of truthfulness” in human
societies.242 Those reasons include both a fear of the coercive power
of deception as well as the need for a “minimal degree of trust” for
language and action to have any meaning.243 Without the ability to
distinguish and rely on truth, members of a society could no longer
make judgments about reality.244 Such a society, according to Bok,
would collapse.245 
Bok’s focus is on societies rather than law, but her analysis offers
insight into any system that is predicated on mutual reliance and
trust for its operation. The American legal system privileges truth
in the courtroom in part because truth is essential to the whole idea
of law. Without the guarantee that witnesses will generally be
truthful and that other legal actors will generally comply with their
own obligations to themselves to be truthful as they carry out the
law, the system would become unmoored from reality to a degree
that would eliminate its usefulness as a system of law rather than
a system of blind coercion. As Bok writes, “trust in some degree of
veracity functions as a foundation of relations among human beings;
when this trust shatters or wears away, institutions collapse.”246
Of course, this does not suggest that no lying can be tolerated or
even tell us “what kinds of lies should be prohibited.”247 Bok con-
tends that “in any situation where a lie is a possible choice, one
must first seek truthful alternatives.”248 As the preceding Parts have
pointed out, our legal system has not obviously embraced this
maxim. We have long tolerated and condoned practices that involve
forms of oath breaking and fiction for reconciling fundamental
242. BOK, supra note 17, at 18 (emphasis omitted).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 19.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 31.
247. Id. 
248. Id.
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misalignments between formal legal outcomes and social concep-
tions of what is just. Systemic lying has been equated with both the
legal fiction and with jury nullification. Yet the stakes involved in
institutionalizing repeated and collective lying in the courtroom are
higher than those involved in more subtle manipulations of the law
by individual players. 
In a system that holds out the oath and the promise of truthful-
ness in the courtroom as key means of achieving both coherence and
factual accuracy, any practice through which participants lie repeat-
edly in violation of a sworn duty destabilizes the system by showing
truth to be a subordinate value. When the lying involves judges and
attorneys who are themselves officers of the court and are under a
professional obligation to maintain the integrity of the system, the
corrosive potential multiplies. If prosecutors tolerate perjury, then
the threat of perjury prosecution loses its efficacy as a truth-
enforcing mechanism. If jurors systematically violate their oaths,
jury verdicts are always suspect. If judges rule in favor of police
officers who are obviously lying, the credibility with which judges
invoke the coercive power of their office is diminished. Ultimately,
systemic lying has the capacity to undermine the justice system to
a fatal extent by replacing the mechanism of truth with an inferior
and dangerous substitute, the lie for a “good” cause.
The danger that systemic lying poses to the legal system has been
underappreciated in part because the distinctions between forms of
lying in the system have gone unacknowledged. In particular, sys-
temic lying has been equated with both legal fictions and routine
jury nullification. As this Section shows, these practices are distinct
from systemic lying and serve as useful counterpoints. Although
legal fictions and jury nullification may pose challenges of their own
to the premise that the legal system is undergirded by truth, they
do not undermine either that premise or that reality to the same
degree as systemic lying. 
The legal fiction provides a useful first point of distinction be-
cause it helps elucidate why lying under oath is an important
feature of systemic lying. In making the claim discussed in the
previous Section that the system should permit false guilty pleas,
Professor Bowers elides the legal fiction with the systemic lie. He
argues that his proposal would simply create a species of legal
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fiction to address dissonance between popular mores and the law.249
Bowers is able to make this claim because legal fictions suffer from
definitional infirmities. Yet legal fictions by any definition, although
mechanisms for legal change, are distinct from systemic lying. In
his classic account, for example, Lon Fuller was able to characterize
legal fictions as “linguistic phenomen[a]”250 and to analyze them as
such precisely because of one of these differences: legal fictions are
written judicial constructions. In Fuller’s words, they are the “grow-
ing pains of the language of the law” which often “fill[ ] a real
linguistic need.”251 
Rather than involving collective oath breaking in the courtroom,
legal fictions are an accepted common law judicial tool for adapt-
ing legal concepts to cover new circumstances that fit the sense
of the concept but not its formal terms. They have been criticized
for confusing the lay consumer of the law,252 but they do not
implicate the legal imperative of truth in the courtroom. Judges’
oaths generally require that they faithfully and impartially dis-
charge their duties under the laws and the Constitution.253 As a
long-established mechanism for applying the law, the legal fiction
does not contravene that sworn duty in the generality of cases.
Jury nullification presents another important contrast to systemic
lying. Much of the scholarly discussion of jury nullification has not
offered a clear definition of terms.254 By most accounts, however,
jury nullification happens whenever “a jury votes to acquit a defen-
dant despite the fact that the defendant is guilty under the letter of
249. Bowers, supra note 223, at 1171 (“False pleas are only less truthful than ... other
fictions by degree.”).
250. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 11 (1967).
251. Id. at 22.
252. Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMEN-
TARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 59-60 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
253. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (prescribing an oath for federal judges).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (“ ‘[N]ullification’
can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word
conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons.”); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor &
Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts
Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1253-55 (2003) (“Scholars examining the
issue of jury nullification agree that defining and identifying jury nullification is complex.”);
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (1999) (“At the
most general level, jury nullification occurs when jurors choose not to follow the law as it is
given to them by the judge.”).
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the law.”255 Because juries are sworn to uphold the law, their
decision not to convict when the facts seem to permit no other
outcome constitutes oath breaking.256 There is also general agree-
ment that jury nullification occurs for one of several reasons. The
jury may believe that the law itself is unjust.257 The jury may decide
that applying the law in a particular case would be wrong.258 Or, the
jury may conclude that the punishment would be too harsh if it were
to convict in a given case.259 Thus, like systemic lying, jury nullifica-
tion as it has been understood reflects rationales that are closely
linked to the jury’s perception of justice. 
Unlike systemic lying, however, even if the jury’s case-specific
reason is broad enough to apply in other cases, the features of our
jury trials—juries are selected anew for each case and cannot be
told they have the power to nullify—should preclude consistent nul-
lification for the same reason across cases. Thus, the broad umbrella
of jury nullification is distinct in at least one crucial way from
systemic lying—it does not have a unified, justice-based rationale
that holds constant across cases.260
255. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1340 (2008).
256. See, e.g., Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614 (“Nullification is by definition, a violation of a
juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court—in the words of the standard oath
administered to jurors in the federal courts, to ‘render a true verdict according to the law and
the evidence.’” (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DIST. COURT JUDGES 225
(4th ed. 1996)); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 50-62
(1973) (outlining arguments that jury nullification violates jurors’ obligation to decide cases
in accordance with instructions and evidence).
257. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 121, at 1178 (describing a category of nullification in
which “jurors simply refuse to enforce a valid (although in their minds unjust) statute”).
258. Id. at 1183 (identifying jury nullification in cases “in which a just law seems unjustly
applied”).
259. See, e.g., Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614 (noting that “jurors may nullify, for example,
because of the identity of a party, a disapprobation of the particular prosecution at issue, or
a more general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws”); Barkow, supra note 255,
at 1340.
260. The Zenger case provides a classic example of jury nullification. Zenger was charged
with seditious libel for publishing a newspaper critical of the New York governor. JAMES
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 93-100
(Stanley Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1963). In such a prosecution, truth was not a recognized
defense. The Attorney General only needed to prove that Zenger had printed or published the
statement. Andrew Hamilton argued successfully for the defense that although Zenger had
published the offending papers, truth should be a defense in such an action and the jury
should act on its conscience and acquit. Id.
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Under its broadest construction, jury nullification also lacks
another important feature of systemic lying—the cooperation of
multiple actors in the system. Scholars have long debated whether
judges or attorneys should be permitted to instruct or make argu-
ments to the jury about nullification.261 The reality is, however, that
since the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1895 that juries do not have
the power to find the law,262 federal judges must instruct jurors to
follow the law as articulated by the judge in jury instructions.263
With the exception of two states with limited constitutional provi-
sions allowing the jury to find law264 and one state with recent
legislation entitling judges to allow defense attorneys to inform the
jury of “its right to judge the facts and the application of the law in
relationship to the facts in controversy,”265 most states are similarly
restrictive. Defense counsel “can neither argue that the jury should
disregard those instructions nor present evidence in favor of the
proposition that the defendant should be acquitted despite violating
the law.”266 An attorney who hints of nullification to the jury can be
sanctioned,267 and a judge who suggests it commits reversible er-
ror.268 Those very real checks on cooperation by judges or attorneys
261. Compare Butler, supra note 218, at 708 (arguing in favor of jury nullification to
confront racial inequities within the criminal justice system), with Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not
Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control, 67
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1996) (“By allowing or encouraging juries to follow their
individual consciences to determine which laws are unjust, we are enabling the views of a
very small minority, for better or worse, to become the law.”).
262. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106-07 (1895).
263. For a comprehensive survey of the federal case law on this issue, see Nancy S. Marder,
The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285,
310 n.116 (1999).
264. Indiana and Maryland both maintain a limited right for juries to find law. See IND.
CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. art. XXIII.
265. See H.B. 146, 2012 Sess. (N.H. 2012).
266. KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 361 (1987).
267. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 4-7.7(d) (3d ed. 1993) (prohibiting defense counsel from making arguments “which
would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence”).
268. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 532 N.E. 2d 1273, 1274 (N.Y. 1988) (“While there is nothing
to prevent a petit jury from acquitting although finding that the prosecution has proven its
case, this so-called ‘mercy dispensing power’, as defendant concedes, is not a legally
sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court.”).
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mean that jury nullification, if it occurs,269 is the product of one
actor within the justice system: the jury. 
Systemic lying, in contrast, involves collective lying, either
through individual actors whose lies are then countenanced by
others in contravention of explicit legal imperatives or through oath
breaking by multiple actors in the system. It is this collective and
open violation of the truth imperative in court repeatedly for the
same reason with the collaboration of actors who are responsible for
policing the system for untruths that has the greatest capacity for
harm. When systemic lying occurs, other instances of lying in court
are likely to increase because participants will no longer believe
that the truth is important, or because they will not credit the
mechanisms put in place to encourage or coerce truthfulness. If, as
the system assumes, maximizing truthfulness is central to the
project of producing just and accurate outcomes, then this risk
should be troubling in and of itself. In addition, there is a clear
trajectory from what is perceived to be justified lying to breakdowns
in obedience to other requirements of the system. For example, an
officer who engages in testilying may graduate to coercion and
evidence planting, extending the questionable moral imperative to
lie in a case of obvious guilt to increasingly problematic scenarios.270
269. How often jury nullification occurs is unclear. In civil cases, the empirical data
“suggest that the phenomenon is not terribly prevalent.” Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1610-11 (2001). In criminal cases, scholars have reached a similar
conclusion. As the authors of one empirical study observed, “[I]t is difficult for jurors
themselves—and even more so for judges or lawyers—to separate clearly the evidentiary
versus the nullification motives that may underlie jury verdicts,” making it even more
challenging for scholars to determine how often the practice occurs. Hannaford-Agor & Hans,
supra note 254, at 1277. That study found it “unlikely that jury nullification plays a dominant
role in the large majority of cases” because other factors, such as perceptions of the strength
of the evidence and the dynamics of the jury deliberation, also play major roles in acquittal
and hung juries. Id. at 1276.
270. In a recent op-ed in the New York Times, Michelle Alexander, the author of The New
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, argued that police lying has
reached epidemic proportions. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at SR4. Alexander contended that “the police shouldn’t be trusted any
more than any other witness, perhaps less so,” citing our “seemingly insatiable appetite for
locking up and locking out the poorest and darkest among us” as the explanation for “a police
culture that treats lying as the norm.” Id. In order to meet the arrest quotas that are the key
to federal and other funding, police departments encourage their officers to fabricate the
probable cause necessary to make arrests. Id. Fiction, too, provides examples of the slippery
slope to corruption. See, e.g., TANA FRENCH, BROKEN HARBOR (2013) (describing the resig-
nation of a police detective who plants evidence to secure the conviction and safety of a
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By undermining truth in the courtroom, systemic lying threatens
that bedrock principle of the legal system, opening the door to lying
and corruption of many varieties and ultimately offering the
prospect of a system wholly removed from reality.
2. Procedural Integrity
Systemic lying also has the potential to influence perceptions of
the procedural fairness of the system. The legal system is structured
around dual imperatives: to “arrive[ ] at the truth,” particularly in
criminal trials, and to use legally permissible and procedurally
acceptable means in doing so.271 This suggests that both truthful-
ness and procedural fidelity are important. Systemic lying can
deliver what may in some cases be more “just” outcomes, but it does
so at the expense of compliance with and enforcement of procedural
mechanisms intended to promote truthfulness. This is problematic
because it conveys the outward message that procedural protections
are not absolute and because it may have real repercussions for the
system’s ability to carry out its mandate. If, as Tom Tyler has
persuasively shown in multiple contexts, “procedural issues are the
primary concern when people evaluate their experiences with legal
authorities,” then producing a “just” outcome while openly sacrific-
ing procedural protections is a dangerous tradeoff.272 Systemic lying
may affect compliance with the law because it harms the perception
of procedural fairness and thereby legitimacy and that perception
is crucial to compliance with legal rules.273
In the case of systemic lying, the procedural protections at issue
are the checks built into the system to enforce compliance with the
oath. When one actor in the system violates the oath, as is arguably
the case when a jury nullifies or a judge interprets a statute in a
murderer who would otherwise commit suicide, but once he has opened the to door to
corruption, no matter how justified, the detective is convinced that he will not be able to resist
similar and possibly less justified falsehoods in the future and that his only option is to give
up being a police officer).
271. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980); accord Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“[T]he function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions.”); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a trial
is the determination of truth.”).
272. TYLER, supra note 8, at 108.
273. Id. at 62.
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way that is clearly unsupported by its language, those checks may
be silent, but they are not necessarily overridden. In systemic lying,
by contrast, the very actors who should, for example, ensure that
police perjury is punished and discredited are complicit in allowing
the perjury to thrive and continue. That sends a message not only
about the importance of truth but also about fairness and the pro-
cedural protections that are crucial to our system of justice. How
people react to systemic lying may depend on their assessment of
the outcomes it produces. In other contexts in which citizens come
into contact with the criminal justice system, however, perceptions
of procedural fairness affect perceptions of the legitimacy of the
system more than other concerns, such as whether the law itself is
just.274 
Those who have advocated for and against practices that amount
to systemic lying have, not surprisingly, responded to the problem
it poses for legitimacy. Reformers seeking to change the harsh
criminal penalties that fostered pious perjury also understood it to
be a threat to the integrity of the system. Rather than endorse pious
perjury as a way of ameliorating the harsh penal laws they sought
to change, they argued that grave legitimacy problems would be
inevitable in a system that relies on lies to achieve justice. Much as
philosophers would later argue that “social relationships ... need to
be sustained by mutual truth and credibility,”275 the reformers
argued that pious perjury threatened the very existence of the legal
system.276 Those seeking reform of U.S. divorce laws made similar
claims, demanding reform in order “to save the integrity of the law
274. See id. at 108.
275. MacIntyre, supra note 18, at 326-28.
276. As one reformer stated: 
[W]hen the public see twelve respectable men—in open court—in the face of
day—in the presence of a judge—calling God to witness, that they will give their
verdict according to the evidence, and then declaring things, not very strange,
or uncommon, but actual physical impossibilities, absolute miracles ... what
impression on the public mind must be made, if not this—that there are
occasions, in which it is not only lawful, but commendable, to call God to witness
palpable and egregious falsehood?
Buxton, supra note 47, at 63; see also 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE,
SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 386 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827) (excoriating
Blackstone for the “flat contradiction in terms” inherent in calling any form of perjury
“pious”).
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and the legal process.”277 As was the case with pious perjury, these
reformers suggested that the legitimacy of the legal system was
being undermined by routinized lying in divorce cases.278
In contrast, advocates in favor of practices that would amount to
systemic lying claim that the system already lacks legitimacy in
their areas of focus and that their proposals would be an improve-
ment over existing bad practices.279 In essence, they contend that
the fact that it may undermine legitimacy does not necessarily
foreclose the possibility that systemic lying provides countervail-
ing and justifiable benefits in a system with real justice deficits.
Similar arguments have been persuasive when applied to jury nul-
lification, which by definition also involves oath violations. Jury
nullification, however, has not destabilized the system. Indeed, de-
spite occasional unfavorable media coverage,280 jury nullification is
more often praised as an important safety valve in a system that
cannot always provide perfect justice.281
Despite its potential perils, whether systemic lying should similar-
ly be embraced as a safety valve in an imperfect system is a compli-
cated question. Bowers identifies two ways in which contemporary
courts are arguably using systemic lying as a safety valve in the
context of plea bargaining.282 The first is by allowing defendants to
plead guilty to crimes they clearly did not commit.283 And the sec-
ond is by allowing defendants to enter guilty pleas to hypothetical
277. Scott, supra note 54, at 17.
278. Id. at 15-16.
279. Bowers, supra note 223, at 1123-24 (suggesting that innocent defendants should plead
guilty rather than nolo contendere when accepting a plea bargain); Butler, supra note 218,
at 679 (arguing that jurors should consider refusing to vote to convict nonviolent black
defendants).
280. For example, after the police officer on trial for beating Rodney King was acquitted
despite a video that clearly showed the event, “jury nullification was one of several
explanations offered” in the media for the acquittal. Marder, supra note 263, at 294-96.
281. See, e.g., Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing
Jurors About Punishment in Mandatory Sentencing Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 343, 386
(1983) (arguing that nullification is part of “the jury’s role as the conscience of the democratic
community”); Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a
Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 244 (1993) (arguing that jury
nullification “does not cast doubt on the jury process; rather, it reaffirms the liberty of a free
society upon which it is based”).
282. Bowers, supra note 223, at 1170-71.
283. Id. at 1170.
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crimes.284 Both are ways to adjust sentences downward under the
sentencing guidelines; and both are different from ordinary plea
bargaining in that they do not involve adjusting the consequences
of a plea by choosing from a list of crimes that in fact describe the
conduct of the defendant. Instead, they require multiple actors to
acquiesce in an untruth under circumstances in which such false-
hood is explicitly prohibited. According to Bowers and others, these
practices are happening because of the perception that, in their
absence, the combination of the criminal code and the sentencing
guidelines will not allow for just sentences.285 Forms of plea bargain-
ing that satisfy these criteria are thus successors to pious perjury in
the sense that they use collective lying to add sentencing options.
Should they be embraced as an ongoing remedy for sentencing prob-
lems that have so far proved intractable in the face of reforms?286
There are two ways to answer this. The first answer is that
whether we think systemic lying in the plea bargaining context is
worth the risks to the judicial system’s truth imperative and ulti-
mately to its legitimacy will depend on how we view sentencing laws
and how we understand what is morally right in particular sentenc-
ing scenarios. The second answer is that we should reject systemic
lying as a long-term solution to any moral-formal dilemma, no
matter how intractable. This rejection is called for, in part, because
of the potential for systemic lying to mask problems within the
system and, in so doing, delay reforms. More importantly, however,
284. Id. at 1170-71
285. See, e.g., id. at 1159-65, 1173-74.
286. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-21 (2010) (describing the history of sentencing reform from full
discretion for judges to mandatory sentencing under strict guidelines to the hybrid Booker
era). That systemic lying has taken root in at least two areas of criminal law in the form of
testilying and dishonest pleas reinforces the notion, put forward by many, that criminal law
is experiencing a profound and multifaceted crisis. See, e.g., Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in the
Criminal Justice System, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 33, 33-34 (1991) (arguing that the criminal
justice system is not only in crisis due to funding, caseload, and overcrowding problems, but
also because there is a crisis in the rule of law). And there is some evidence that momentum
may be building to address some of the substantive problems that have led to systemic lying
in this context. The issue of sentencing, in particular, has recently generated an improbable
alliance between libertarian Republicans and Democratic Attorney General Eric H. Holder,
Jr., in favor of reform. Matt Apuzzo, Unlikely Allies Push for a Liberalization of Sentencing
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2014, at A13 (describing an “unlikely” alliance between Eric Holder
and Senator Rand Paul to promote sentencing reform). Whether those efforts will enable us
to move beyond systemic lying in the plea context, or in other contexts, remains to be seen.
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we should reject systemic lying because in the long run the system
cannot sustain it as a solution to problems arising from strong
discord between collective moral beliefs and legal prescriptions. As
Bok writes, “only where a lie is a last resort can one even begin to
consider whether or not it is morally justified” and even then, we
should “seek truthful alternatives.”287
History suggests that episodes of systemic lying will have an
uneasy and ultimately transitory presence in the justice system. At
some point, there will be majority support for sustained attention
and intervention to address the problem, however imperfectly. This
Article cannot definitively answer how we get to what we might call
systemic lying “tipping points” and move into some consensus that
we should commit to resolving the problems that generate systemic
lying.288 Factors such as the political climate, the degree of moral
consensus, the relative visibility or marginalization of the groups
affected, and the availability of a clear remedy will undoubtedly
play a role. What the case studies—as well as the current momen-
tum in favor of criminal justice reform—do suggest is that we will
ultimately arrive at such moments. Systemic lying has been a
feature of the common law for centuries, but unlike other so-called
nullification practices, it should not be granted a legitimized place
in our legal system. 
CONCLUSION
The taxonomy of systemic lying is a powerful tool. It points to a
form of lying that poses a particular threat to the legitimacy and
functioning of the legal system. In a legal regime designed to keep
lying to a minimum, collective lying in the courtroom that is ac-
cepted as a way to circumvent substantive law, procedural rules, or
constitutional imperatives presents challenges that are distinct
from those that arise from other means of resolving cognitive
dissonance in the law. Identifying systemic lying is important be-
cause it tells us that our legal rules are out of adjustment with the
beliefs of a social group wide enough to embolden multiple actors in
287. BOK, supra note 17, at 31.
288. Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 12 (2000) (describing tipping points as “moment[s] of critical mass” when social
change occurs).
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the legal system to collude in lying to achieve different legal out-
comes. Although cures for systemic lying are often challenging and
always varied, it is imperative that we seek them and protect the
integrity of our legal actors, of our courtrooms, and of our system of
justice itself.
